Involuntary Transfers under UCC Secion 9-311 by Sortor, Carolyn
SMU Law Review
Volume 39 | Issue 2 Article 5
1985
Involuntary Transfers under UCC Secion 9-311
Carolyn Sortor
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.smu.edu/smulr
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in SMU Law Review
by an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more information, please visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Carolyn Sortor, Involuntary Transfers under UCC Secion 9-311, 39 Sw L.J. 709 (1985)
https://scholar.smu.edu/smulr/vol39/iss2/5
INVOLUNTARY TRANSFERS UNDER UCC
SECTION 9-311
by Carolyn Sortor
RTICLE 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code' governs secured
transactions. Section 9-311 of the Code states that a debtor has
rights in collateral that may be transferred despite any provision in
the security agreement prohibiting transfer or making transfer a default.2
Although section 9-311 was part of the original draft of article 9 and has
never been revised,3 courts began to apply the section consistently only
within the last decade.4 This Comment reviews involuntary transfers under
section 9-311 in four steps. First, the Comment discusses the meaning and
purpose of section 9-311. Second, the interests and policy considerations
involved in involuntary transfers are analyzed to determine desirable and
undesirable effects of possible applications of section 9-311. Third, the Com-
ment surveys the different applications of section 9-311 to involuntary trans-
fers5 in jurisdictions that have adopted the Code6 and evaluates the
1. Hereinafter referred to as the Code. All sections cited are from U.C.C. (1978) (that is,
the 1972 revised version) unless otherwise indicated.
2. U.C.C. § 9-311 (1978).
3. Some sections of article 9 were revised in 1972. See SELECTED COMMERCIAL STAT-
UTES 807-80 (West 1983 ed.).
4. For a summary of cases in which § 9-311 was or should have been invoked as of 1975,
see Justice, Secured Parties and Judgment Creditors-The Courts and Section 9-311 of the
Uniform Commercial Code, 30 Bus. LAW. 433, 435-44 (1975).
5. Although this Comment discusses involuntary transfers, its survey of decisions that
invoked or should have invoked § 9-311 includes cases involving voluntary transfers because
several issues are common to both kinds of transfers. For a discussion of cases involving vol-
untary transfers, see Nickles, Enforcing Article 9 Security Interests Against Subordinate Buyers
of Collateral, 50 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 511 (1982).
6. American Samoa, the Canal Zone, Guam, and Puerto Rico have not adopted the
Code. The Virgin Islands and every state except Louisiana have adopted the Code with minor
variations. The state provisions corresponding to § 9-311 are: ALA. CODE § 7-9-311 (1984);
ALASKA STAT. § 45.09.311 (1984); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-3132 (Supp. 1984-1985);
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 85-9-311 (1961); CAL. COM. CODE § 9311 (West Supp. 1985); COLO.
REV. STAT. § 4-9-311 (1973); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 42a-9-311 (1983); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6,
§ 9-311 (Supp. 1984); D.C. CODE ANN. § 28:9-311 (1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 679.9-311
(West 1966); GA. CODE ANN. § 109A-9-311 (1979); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 490:9-311 (1976);
IDAHO CODE § 28-9-311 (1980); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 26, § 9-311 (Smith-Hurd 1974); IND.
CODE ANN. § 26-1-9-311 (Bums 1974); IOWA CODE ANN. § 554.9311 (West 1967); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 84-9-311 (1983); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 355.9-311 (Bobbs-Merrill 1972); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 9-311 (1964); MD. COM. LAW CODE ANN. § 9-311 (1975); MASS.
ANN. LAWS ch. 106, § 9-311 (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1984); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 440.9311 (West 1967); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 336.9-311 (West 1966); MiSS. CODE ANN. § 75-
9-311 (1981); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 400.9-311 (Vernon 1965); MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-9-311
(1983); NEB. REV. STAT. § 9-311 (U.C.C.) (1980); NEV. REV. STAT. § 104.9311 (1979); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 382-A:9-311 (1961 & Supp. 1983); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 12A:9-311 (West
1969); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 55-9-311 (1984); N.Y.U.C.C. § 9-311 (McKinney 1964); N.C.
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applications in terms of the previous discussion of desirable and undesirable
effects. Finally, the Comment examines emerging trends in the application
of section 9-311 and recommends certain changes.
I. INTRODUCTION TO SECTION 9-311
A. Section 9-311: What It Does and Does Not Mean
Uniform Commercial Code section 9-3117 states that a debtor's rights in
collateral 8 may be transferred. Transfers may be voluntary9 or involuntary' 0
and may be effected despite any provision in a security agreement I purport-
ing to prohibit transfer or making transfer constitute a default.' 2 Section 9-
311 thus permits a debtor to make an effective gift or sale of his interest in
collateral 13 and allows creditors seeking property on which to levy to obtain
GEN. STAT. § 25-9-311 (1965 & Supp. 1983); N.D. CENT. CODE § 41-09-32 (1960); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 1309.30 (Page 1979); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 9-311 (West 1963);
OR. REV. STAT. § 79.3110 (1984); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 9311 (Purdon 1984); R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 6A-9-311 (1970); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-311 (Law. Co-op. 1977); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS ANN. § 57A-9-311 (1980); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-9-311 (1979); TEx. Bus. & COM.
CODE ANN. § 9.311 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968 & Supp. 1985); UTAH CODE ANN. § 70A-9-
311 (1981); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9A, § 9-311 (1966); V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 11A, § 9-311 (1965);
VA. CODE § 8.9-311 (1965); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 62A.9-311 (1966); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 409.311 (West 1964); WYO. STAT. § 34-21-940 (1977).
7. U.C.C. § 9-311 (1978):
§ 9-311. Alienability of Debtor's Rights: Judicial Process.
The debtor's rights in collateral may be voluntarily or involuntarily transferred
(by way of sale, creation of a security interest, attachment, levy, garnishment or
other judicial process) notwithstanding a provision in the security agreement
prohibiting any transfer or making the transfer constitute a default.
8. Collateral is property pledged as security for the satisfaction of a debt. BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 237 (5th ed. 1979). The Code provides that collateral includes accounts, con-
tract rights, and chattel paper that have been sold. U.C.C. § 9-105(c) (1978).
9. Voluntary transfers include creation of a junior security interest, sale, and gift. See
Clark Jewelers v. Satterthwaite, 8 Kan. App. 2d 569, 662 P.2d 1301, 1304 (1983) (possession of
bridal set resulting from gift not wrongful because debtor may voluntarily transfer his rights in
collateral).
10. Involuntary transfers include attachment, levy, garnishment, and "other judicial pro-
cess." U.C.C. § 9-311 (1978). One court held that other judicial process under § 9-311 in-
cludes a division of community property in a divorce proceeding. Goetz v. Goetz, 567 S.W.2d
892, 895 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1978, no writ).
11. The Code defines a security agreement as an agreement that creates or provides for a
security interest. U.C.C. § 9-105 (1978). A security interest is an interest in personal property
or fixtures that secures payment or performance of an obligation. U.C.C. §§ 1-201(37), 9-102
(1978). Black's Law Dictionary defines security agreement as an agreement granting a credi-
tor a security interest in personal property. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1217 (5th ed. 1979).
A security interest is an interest in property, acquired by contract for the purpose of securing
payment or performance of an obligation. Id.
12. U.C.C. § 9-311 (1978).
13. E.g., Citizens Bank v. Perrin & Sons, Inc., 253 Ark. 639, 488 S.W.2d 14, 15 (1972)
(Code abrogated restrictions upon alienation of encumbered property); Layne v. Fort Carson
Nat'l Bank, 655 P.2d 856, 857 (Colo. Ct. App. 1982) (debtor could transfer interest but bank
not required to consent); Decatur Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Murphy, 119 Ill. App. 3d 277, 456
N.E.2d 267, 274 (1983) (transfer of interest in growing crops in which a secured party had a
prior interest was valid); Clark Jewelers v. Satterthwaite, 8 Kan. App. 2d 569, 662 P.2d 1301,
1304 (1983) (debtor's gift of bridal set to defendant not wrongful since debtor may transfer
collateral); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 9-311 comment (1964) (debtor can transfer his
right in collateral without secured party's consent and despite agreement permitting secured
party to repossess collateral if transferred).
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a transfer of the debtor's interest. 14 In the case of involuntary transfer a
third party attempts to stake a claim in collateral in which the secured party
and the debtor have pre-existing rights. Although section 9-311 refers to
attachment, levy, garnishment, and other judicial process, 15 the section
leaves to non-Code law the substantive and procedural details of how to
resolve any conflict among competing interests in the collateral. 16 Conse-
quently, treatment of similar fact situations under section 9-311 varies
among the states and sometimes among cases within a single state. 17
Under article 9 parties to a secured transaction may define in a security
agreement the events that will constitute default. 18 Section 9-311, however,
provides that a transfer of the debtor's rights in the collateral is effective
even if the parties agree that such a transfer constitutes a default. The se-
cured party may bring an action for breach of the agreement or may resort
to its remedies under article 9,19 but the secured party may not prevent or
annul the transfer. According to the official comment to section 9-311, one
purpose of the section is to change the pre-Code rule in some jurisdictions
that if title to collateral remained in a mortgagee20 or conditional seller,21
other creditors could not reach the collateral. 22
14. E.g., American Heritage Bank & Trust v. 0. & E., Inc., 40 Colo. App. 306, 576 P.2d
566, 568 (1978) (debtor's rights in collateral may be involuntarily transferred under § 9-311);
Dick Warner Cargo Handling Corp. v. Aetna Business Credit, Inc., 700 F.2d 858, 863-64 (2d
Cir. 1983) (funds held by secured party that are due to debtor subject to condition subsequent
are garnishable); New Jersey Bank v. Community Ass'n/ Farms, Inc., 666 F.2d 813, 819 (3d
Cir. 1981) (judgment creditor of real estate developer may levy on fund held by secured party
bank); Murdock v. Blake, 26 Utah 2d 22, 484 P.2d 164, 168-69 (1971) (purpose of§ 9-311 is to
provide without equivocation that debtor's interest in collateral remains subject to claims of
creditors).
15. U.C.C. § 9-311 (1978).
16. Id. comment 2 (states left to determine "appropriate process" that allows creditors to
reach debtor's rights in collateral).
17. Compare William Iselin & Co. v. Burgess & Leigh, Ltd., 52 Misc. 2d 821, 276
N.Y.S.2d 659, 662 (Sup. Ct. 1967) (secured party had right to possession of collateral, there-
fore lien creditor's levy vacated), with Roehmer & Zeller, Inc. v. Ace Transmission Center,
Inc., 114 Misc. 2d 415, 454 N.Y.S.2d 377 (Sup. Ct. 1982) (junior secured party entitled to
replevy and sell collateral because senior secured party may not protect debtor's assets from
seizure).
18. Although the Code provides definitions for many terms, see §§ 1-201 and 9-105, the
Code does not define default. A security agreement should, therefore, define the term. Stan-
dard events constituting default include: (1) sale or encumbrance of collateral; (2) death or
dissolution of the debtor; (3) insolvency or bankruptcy of the debtor; (4) judgment against the
debtor; (5) attachment, execution, or other judicial process on the collateral; (6) nonpayment;
(7) breach of any of the debtor's warranties in the agreement. Henderson, The Judicial Credi-
tor Versus the Article Nine Secured Party, 17 IDAHO L. REV. 193, 198 (1981); see also Riegert,
Secured Transactions Part III, 1984 CoM. L.J. 127 (events typically defined to constitute
default).
19. Part V of article 9 sets forth secured parties' remedies on default by the debtor. See
infra notes 106-13 and accompanying text.
20. A mortgagee is one who takes or receives a mortgage. BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY
912 (5th ed. 1979). A mortgage is an interest created by a written instrument providing secur-
ity for the performance of a duty or payment of a debt. Id. at 911.
21. A conditional sale is one in which the transfer of title depends upon the performance
of a condition, usually the payment of the purchase price. Id. at 1200.
22. U.C.C. § 9-311 comment 2 (1978); see Citizens Bank v. Perrin & Sons, Inc., 253 Ark.
639, 488 S.W.2d 14, 15 (1972) (under pre-Code law in Arkansas debtor's interest in mortgaged
personalty held not subject to sale by attachment or execution); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-311
1985]
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Section 9-311 interacts with other Code provisions. Although this Com-
ment generally discusses the relation of section 9-311 to other Code sections
as they arise in context, 23 three Code sections warrant immediate attention.
First, insofar as section 9-311 permits transfer despite a prohibition in the
security agreement, the section creates an exception to the general rule of
section 9-201.24 The general rule provides that a security agreement is effec-
tive according to its terms between the parties to the agreement, against
other creditors of the debtor, and against purchasers of the collateral.25 Sec-
ond, section 9-306(2)26 states that, except as otherwise provided by article 9,
a security interest continues in both the collateral and in any identifiable
proceeds notwithstanding disposition of the collateral, unless the secured
party authorized the disposition. This section strongly suggests that, despite
a valid transfer of the debtor's rights under section 9-311, a security interest
continues in the collateral and in the proceeds. 27 Third, section 9-301 pro-
vides inferential support for the proposition that section 9-311 applies to
both perfected 28 and unperfected security interests. Section 9-301 subordi-
nates an unperfected security interest to the interests of several other kinds
of parties, including lien creditors,29 and thus would render section 9-311
superfluous in part if section 9-311 applied only to unperfected security in-
terests. Section 9-311, however, is not a priority rule.30 Section 9-311 per-
tains when parties dispute the validity or effect of a transfer of an interest.
comments (Law. Co-op. 1976) (§ 9-311 may change pre-Code law prohibiting involuntary
transfer of debtor's interest in chattel mortgage).
23. See infra the following notes and accompanying text: note 61 (§ 9-504(4)); note 185
(§ 9-402(7)); note 193 (§ 9-307(3)).
24. U.C.C. § 9-201 (1978).
25. Id.
26. U.C.C. § 9-306(2) (1978); see also infra note 93 and accompanying text (1972 revision
deleted apparent requirement that disposition be by the debtor in order for security interest to
continue in collateral and proceeds).
27. See U.C.C. § 9-306(2) comment 3 (1978). When a debtor makes an unauthorized
disposition of collateral the security interest usually continues in the collateral, and the trans-
feree takes subject to the security interest. In some cases the secured party may repossess the
collateral or recover for conversion. The secured party may claim both the collateral and
proceeds from the disposition of the collateral, but may obtain only one satisfaction. Code
sections 9-301 (persons who take priority over unperfected security interests), 9-307 (protec-
tion of buyers in ordinary course of business), 9-308 (purchase of chattel paper and instru-
ments), and 9-309 (protection of purchasers of instruments, documents, and securities) state
the circumstances in which a transferee may take free of a security interest. The comment to
§ 9-306(2) appears to suggest that the secured party will have a right to proceeds in these
circumstances.
28. A perfected security interest arises when a secured party takes the necessary steps to
give the security interest priority over holders of other interests in a property. The steps neces-
sary for perfection depend on the type of collateral and are described in U.C.C. §§ 9-302, -303,
and -305 (1978). To perfect an interest in most types of collateral, a secured party must file a
financing statement in a public record or take possession of the collateral. U.C.C. § 9-302
(1978).
29. See 2 G. GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY § 38.5 (1965)
(although § 9-311 does not expressly provide that transfer is effective even if security interest is
perfected, the section would be pointless unless applicable to perfected interests, since creditors
and purchasers take free of unperfected interests under § 9-301, and other secured parties take
free under § 9-312(5)).
30. The rules governing priority in article 9 include § 9-201 (general rule; see supra text
accompanying note 24), § 9-301 (secured party versus lien creditor), § 9-307 (secured party
[Vol. 39
COMMENTS
In some cases, however, the operation of priority rules may render transfer
issues under section 9-311 moot. 3 1
B. Fact Pattern and Alternative Treatments
Because section 9-311 abstains from prescribing means for resolving the
competing interests in involuntarily transferred collateral, several alternative
treatments exist. These alternatives arise from variations in state procedural
law, contingencies of fact, and courts' interpretations of section 9-311. Part
II of this Comment discusses the alternative treatments in detail. This sub-
part introduces the type of fact pattern in which section 9-311 may apply
and briefly sketches the alternative treatments that the section allows.
Secured Party agrees to lend money to Debtor for the purchase of collat-
eral. The parties execute a security agreement 32 under which Secured Party
acquires a security interest 33 in the collateral. The security agreement con-
tains a provision specifying that any transfer of the collateral will constitute
a default 34 by Debtor. The agreement further provides that transfer includes
any attachment, 35 levy, 36 garnishment,37 or other judicial process on the col-
lateral. Subsequently, Creditor obtains a judgment against Debtor and,
seeking property of Debtor on which to levy, learns of the collateral. Under
section 9-311 Creditor may reach Debtor's rights in the collateral 38 by
means of appropriate process. 39 Creditor will want to levy on the collateral,
especially if the value of Debtor's rights in the collateral exceeds the amount
of Secured Party's secured debt.g° If Creditor levies on the collateral,4 1 this
versus purchaser), and § 9-312 (secured party versus secured party). Part III of article 9 con-
tains other priority rules governing special situations.
31. For example, some cases presented the question of whether a lien creditor could gar-
nish a particular interest of the debtor. See Dick Warner Cargo Handling Corp. v. Aetna
Business Credit, Inc., 700 F.2d 858 (2d Cir. 1983); New Jersey Bank v. Community Ass'n/
Farms, Inc., 666 F.2d 813 (3d Cir. 1981). If the lien creditor in these cases had established
that the secured party had not properly perfected its interest, then the lien creditor would have
had priority over the secured party as to the whole collateral. Instead, the courts limited the
lien creditors to merely the debtor's rights in the collateral. U.C.C. § 9-311 (1978). See infra
note 197 for discussion of the debtor's rights.
32. For the definition of security agreement, see supra note 11.
33. For the definition of security interest, see supra note 11.
34. The Code does not define default. Parties to a secured transaction may define default
in their agreement. See supra note 18 for a list of standard default provisions.
35. Attachment constitutes an ancillary remedy by which a plaintiff may acquire a lien on
property of the defendant for satisfaction of a judgment ultimately to be entered in the action.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 115 (5th ed. 1979).
36. Levy means to assess, execute, exact, or collect; a levy is a seizure or exaction. Id. at
816. In the context of this Comment "levy" usually refers to a taking of property into custody
of the court. See infra note 41 for a summary of levy and execution in Texas.
37. Garnishment is a statutory proceeding whereby a court applies defendant's property
in the possession of a third party to payment of a debt owed to the plaintiff. BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 612 (5th ed. 1979).
38. U.C.C. § 9-311 (1978).
39. Id. comment 2.
40. If Secured Party failed to perfect its interest, then the priority rule in § 9-301(l)(b)
preempts § 9-311 and Creditor will prevail. See supra notes 29 and 31 and accompanying text.
If Secured Party did perfect its interest, however, then under most interpretations of § 9-311
Secured Party's interest will continue in both the collateral and in any proceeds from disposi-
tion. U.C.C. § 9-306(2) (1978). In this event Creditor ordinarily will not gain any satisfaction
1985]
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event constitutes a default by Debtor under the security agreement. On de-
fault section 9-50342 entitles Secured Party to take possession of the
collateral.
At this point section 9-311 permits at least five alternative outcomes. The
outcome depends on what the parties do, on the applicable state law, and on
which legal claims the parties choose to assert. First, state law may provide
that execution terminates any security interest in the collateral. 43 Under this
alternative Secured Party cannot take possession of or otherwise enforce its
44
interest in the collateral, but Secured Party will probably have priority in the
distribution of any proceeds. 45 If the proceeds prove insufficient to repay the
secured debt, Secured Party may or may not have recourse against Debtor46
or Creditor.4 7 Second, statutory law or a court may require Creditor to sat-
isfy the secured debt in order to levy on the collateral.48 Third, if Secured
Party learns of the levy before execution, a court may allow Secured Party to
prevent execution on the collateral. The court, however, may order Secured
Party to dispose of the collateral and distribute the proceeds according to
priority.49 Fourth, Creditor may obtain execution on the collateral, but the
from the collateral unless the value of the collateral exceeds the amount of the secured debt. If
the amount of the secured debt exceeds the value of the collateral and the security interest
continues in the collateral, then a sale of the encumbered property will produce only a small
sum, if anything. If the security interest continues in the proceeds, satisfaction of the secured
debt will likely exhaust the proceeds and leave little or nothing for Creditor. The security
interest may continue in the collateral, in the proceeds, or in both, depending on various fac-
tors discussed infra in Part II of this Comment.
41. A description of levy and execution procedures may be helpful. Although these pro-
cedures vary among the jurisdictions, the following summary of Texas execution procedure
provides an example. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 621-56; 5 W. DORSANEO, TEXAS LITIGATION
GUIDE ch. 132 (1977 and Supp. Mar. 1984). A creditor who prevails in an action against a
debtor, thus becoming a judgment creditor, may obtain a writ of execution, a process of the
court issued to enforce the judgment of that court. The creditor delivers the writ to a sheriff or
other officer, who must then proceed to levy execution on property of the debtor. A lien arises
when the officer levies on the property, and the creditor becomes a lien creditor. Levy occurs
when the officer brings the property under the control and custody of the court. See supra note
36 for a definition of levy. The officer holds an execution sale to obtain funds to satisfy the
judgment. The sale, usually public, is preceded by notice to specific parties and general notice
by publication. If the creditor buys the property at the sale, the creditor may resell privately to
try to realize the amount owed by the debtor. If the proceeds from the sale of the first property
levied upon do not satisfy the judgment, the officer begins the process again.
42. U.C.C. § 9-503 (1978) states that unless otherwise agreed, a secured party has the
right to take possession of the collateral on default by the debtor.
43. See infra notes 91-115 and accompanying text.
44. Use of the pronoun "it" denotes the fact that secured parties are often institutions.
See Jackson & Kronman, Secured Financing and Priorities Among Creditors, 88 YALE L.J.
1143, 1161 (1979).
45. See U.C.C. § 9-306 comment 3 (1978).
46. Under U.C.C. § 9-502(2) (1978) if the security agreement relates to an indebtedness,
as opposed to a sale of accounts or chattel paper, the debtor remains liable for any deficiency
unless otherwise agreed. See Nickles, supra note 5, at 518-20.
47. Under IOWA CODE ANN. § 626.41 (West 1950 & Supp. 1984-1985) if an execution
sale does not realize enough to pay the secured debt, interest, and costs of sale, the judgment
creditor is liable for the deficiency. Cf WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 6.20.050 (1963 & Supp.
1984-1985) (if claimant establishes superior right to possession of collateral, court will tax
costs to creditor seeking execution on collateral).
48. See infra notes 116-36 and accompanying text.
49. See infra notes 137-51 and accompanying text.
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purchaser of the collateral will take the property subject to the security inter-
est.50 If Debtor ceases to make payments to Secured Party, as Debtor is
likely to do once he is deprived of the collateral, the purchaser may have to
assume the payments in order to retain possession of the property.51 In some
jurisdictions, even though the execution sale constitutes a valid transfer
under section 9-311, Secured Party may recover against Creditor or the pur-
chaser for conversion. 52 Fifth, a court may not allow Creditor to reach the
collateral at all on the ground that a default has occurred that entitles Se-
cured Party to possession of the collateral.5 3
C Factors Relevant for Evaluating Treatments
The desirability of the alternative treatments of involuntary transfers
under section 9-311 ultimately depends on how well each treatment accom-
modates the interests of the parties and the relevant policy considerations.
This subpart examines the interests of each party and the policy concerns
and develops criteria by which Part II of this Comment evaluates the alter-
native treatments. First, a secured party is ordinarily an institution that pro-
duces profit by making loans.54 A secured party usually prefers that debtors
also make profits with which to repay the loans. Insofar as levies on a
debtor's assets threaten to disrupt the debtor's business, 55 the levies also
threaten the secured party's interests, even if the levy is not on the secured
party's collateral. If the debtor is in financial trouble, seizure of its assets
may push the debtor into insolvency. 56 For better security the secured party
may obtain a security interest in as much of the debtor's property as the
secured party can demand.57
50. See infra notes 152-202 and accompanying text.
51. As a practical matter, under this alternative a purchaser at an execution sale buys
little more than the debtor's right to redeem. Smith v. Guzman, N.Y.L.J., Feb. 14, 1975, at
17, col. 5 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.); see also Cooper v. Citizens Bank, 129 Ga. App. 261, 199 S.E.2d 369,
372 (1973) (bank may foreclose security interest in hands of purchaser if secured debt exceeds
recovery from creditor for conversion and bank is unable or unwilling to recover balance from
debtor). The latter decision produces rather extreme consequences. Courts should not deem
subsequent purchasers of the collateral to assume the secured obligation in the absence of an
express novation. Nickles, supra note 5, at 516 n.24. The secured party's recovery is based
solely on conversion in cases such as Smith v. Guzman, N.Y.L.J., Feb. 14, 1975, at 17, col. 5
(N.Y. Sup. Ct.). Therefore, courts should not hold a relatively innocent purchaser liable for
conversion when the secured party can recover the debt from the original debtor, but simply
refuses to do so.
52. See infra notes 166-77 and accompanying text.
53. See infra notes 203-09 and accompanying text.
54. See Jackson & Kronman, supra note 44, at 1161-78.
55. For effects of attachment on the debtor's business in the context of a discussion of § 9-
311 involuntary transfers under Idaho statutes, see Henderson, supra note 18, at 217-19.
56. Id. at 234.
57. This end is often attained by means of "after-acquired property" clauses in the secur-
ity agreement that extend the security interest to collateral acquired after execution of the
agreement. U.C.C. § 9-108 comment 1 (1978); see, e.g., Houchen v. First Nat'l Bank (In re
Taylorville Eisner Agency, Inc.), 445 F. Supp. 665, 669 (S.D. Ill. 1977) (secured party need not
file new financing statement in order to retain perfected security interest in after-acquired
property despite transfer of property to new owner); American Heritage Bank & Trust Co. v.
0. & E., Inc., 40 Colo. App. 306, 576 P.2d 566, 568 (1978) (after-acquired property clause
effective to give senior secured party right to property acquired by junior secured party that
19851
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If default by the debtor is inevitable, the secured party wants to foreclose
its interest in the collateral in the most efficient and inexpensive manner pos-
sible.58 The secured party has the right to possession of the collateral59 and
will ordinarily want to liquidate its interest by selling the collateral. 6° The
secured party can obtain more for the collateral in a private sale than in an
execution sale because the secured party can use its own business expertise
or tap that of its contacts in deciding when, where, and how to sell the col-
lateral. In addition, a private sale avoids the costs of obtaining a judgment
and execution. The secured party can sell the collateral free of its own secur-
ity interest, and under section 9-504(4) the sale will discharge any
subordinate interests as well. 61 Thus, without the interference of other cred-
itors, the secured party can efficiently minimize costs and maximize pro-
ceeds. If the secured party cannot prevent execution on the collateral, the
secured party may have a strong interest in the identity, location, and credit-
worthiness of anyone who acquires possession of the collateral or who as-
sumes responsibility for the secured debt.62
A debtor's interests also favor efficiency and economy. On one hand, the
debtor remains liable to either the creditor or the secured party for any defi-
ciency remaining after an execution sale of collateral.63 On the other hand,
if proceeds from the sale of the collateral exceed the total claims against it,
the debtor may claim the excess amount.64 Thus, the debtor wants the col-
lateral to sell for the highest possible price. The debtor may prefer that the
secured party rather than a lien creditor dispose of the collateral for two
reasons. 65 First, a secured party may best be able to maximize proceeds
had assumed possession and operation of debtor's business); Smiley v. Wheeler, 602 P.2d 209,
211 (Okla. 1979) (debtor cannot destroy perfected security interest in after-acquired property
by transferring property). Another means of enhancing security is a "dragnet clause." A
dragnet clause makes a particular piece of property serve as collateral for all future advances.
See Sturdevant v. First Bank, 186 Mont. 91, 606 P.2d 525, 528 (1980) (purchaser of airplane
could not take property free of security interest by retiring loan for that airplane because
dragnet clause made airplane collateral for all subsequent loans to original debtor).
58. For a discussion of factors that affect the secured party, see Riegert, supra note 18, at
128-30.
59. U.C.C. § 9-503 (1978).
60. A secured party may liquidate its interest under U.C.C. § 9-504 (1978). For a discus-
sion of why it may want to do so, see Riegert, supra note 18, at 129-31.
61. Under U.C.C. § 504(4) (1978) foreclosure of a security interest by sale of the collateral
discharges any subordinate interests in the collateral. See Sturdevant v. First Bank, 186 Mont.
91, 606 P.2d 525, 528 (1980) (creditor has right to determine who shall be debtor in posses-
sion); Poydan, Inc. v. Agia Kiriaki, Inc., 130 N.J. Super. 141, 325 A.2d 838, 842-43 (Super. Ct.
Ch. Div. 1974) (secured party entitled to determine who shall be debtor in possession since
unreliable debtor may remove or conceal collateral or allow collateral to deteriorate), affd,
139 N.J. Super. 365, 354 A.2d 99 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976).
62. See U.C.C. § 9-502 (1978). For an example of a state statute providing that the debtor
is liable for any deficiency, see TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 3827a (Vernon Supp. 1985).
63. U.C.C. § 9-502 (1978) (unless otherwise agreed, debtor liable for deficiency remaining
after disposition by secured party); for an example of a state statute, see TEX. REV. CIv. STAT.
ANN. art. 3827a (Vernon 1966 & Supp. 1985).
64. See U.C.C. § 9-502 (1978); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 3827 (Vernon 1966).
65. Under § 9-207 and part V of article 9 a secured party owes several duties to a default-
ing debtor. Briefly, § 9-207 requires the secured party to use reasonable care to preserve collat-
eral in its possession and makes the secured party liable for any loss caused by its failure to
meet these requirements. Sections 9-502(2) and 9-504(2) require the secured party to account
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from disposition. 66 Second, article 9 explicitly makes the secured party lia-
ble to the debtor for any failure to fulfill its Code duties to the debtor. 67
An unsecured judgment creditor 68 seeking to levy on collateral commonly
asserts a claim that is smaller than the secured obligation. Because the un-
secured creditor is less likely than the secured party to be a large institution,
the unsecured creditor frequently cannot afford either to write off the debt or
to invest large amounts of additional money or credit to recover on the origi-
nal debt. 69 The unsecured creditor possibly indirectly benefits the secured
party by extending credit to the debtor that increases the longevity of the
debtor's business operations. 70 Nevertheless, once the unsecured creditor
reduces the debtor's account to a judgment, the unsecured creditor may find
that the secured party's interest encumbers the debtor's assets. The un-
secured creditor may attempt to circumvent the secured interest, if possible,
in order to get its money out of the debtor's assets quickly and easily. 71
Although the unsecured creditor may share with the debtor and secured
party an interest in maximizing proceeds, if the unsecured creditor engages
in a business related to that of the debtor, the unsecured creditor may wish
to purchase the debtor's assets at a low price.72 In either case, however, the
to the debtor for any surplus proceeds from disposition of the collateral. Section 9-504(3)
requires that the secured party give the debtor reasonable notification of the intended disposi-
tion and that the disposition be made in a commercially reasonable manner. Section 9-505(1)
requires the secured party to dispose of the collateral within ninety days of taking possession of
it if the debtor has paid 60% of the loan. If the debtor has not paid 60% of the loan, § 9-
505(2) permits the secured party to retain the collateral. In the latter case the secured party
must notify the debtor that the secured party intends to retain the collateral in satisfaction of
the debt. Under § 9-506 the debtor may redeem the collateral at any time before the secured
party has incurred a binding obligation for disposition of the collateral. Section 9-507 de-
scribes the secured party's liability to the debtor for any loss caused by the secured's failure to
fulfill its duties under part V. A debtor's rights against a lien creditor depend on non-Code
state law and may not be as extensive or as well-defined as a debtor's rights against secured
parties.
66. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
67. U.C.C. § 9-507 (1978).
68. For purposes of this Comment, junior secured parties share the same interests and
policy concerns as unsecured creditors insofar as both are subordinate to a senior secured
party. See U.C.C. §§ 9-301, -312 (1978).
69. See Henderson, supra note 18, at 213-14.
70. On the other hand, the secured party's loan benefits the debtor's other creditors in a
similar way, perhaps by making the debtor's business possible.
71. In several cases a lien creditor knew or should have known that a senior secured party
had an interest in collateral, yet the creditor proceeded to execute on the collateral, presuma-
bly with the hope of gaining an unfair advantage over the secured party. See Cooper v. Citizens
Bank, 129 Ga. App. 261, 199 S.E.2d 369, 372 (1973) (landlord liable in conversion for levying
on and selling tenant's car in which bank had perfected security interest); Smith v. Guzman,
N.Y.L.J., Feb. 14, 1975, at 17, col. 5 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.) (purchasers of restaurant equipment at
execution sale knew of security interest in equipment and were liable for conversion); Murdock
v. Blake, 26 Utah 2d 22, 484 P.2d 164, 169 (1971) (lien creditors who levied on and sold
service station assets despite notification by secured party of its prior perfected interest were
liable for conversion). For a discussion of Murdock, see infra notes 171-77 and accompanying
text. The lien creditors in these cases were held liable for conversion.
72. Lien creditors have purchased collateral at their own execution sales and at prices
below market value. See, e.g., Paccar Fin. Corp. v. Harnett Transfer, Inc., 51 N.C. App. 1,
275 S.E.2d 243, 246 (1981) (one person controlled both debtor corporation and repairing cor-
poration; debtor corporation bought truck at sale held by repairing corporation to foreclose its
mechanic's lien for price representing repair bill; court held security interest not discharged);
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unsecured creditor may be less able and less likely than either the secured
party or the debtor to take a long-term view of the situation.
Since the secured party needs nothing from the unsecured creditor, the
unsecured creditor cannot expect much assistance or cooperation from the
secured party.73 If the value of collateral greatly exceeds the amount of the
secured debt, the unsecured creditor may want to satisfy the debt in order to
execute freely on the collateral. Even if the unsecured creditor does not
want to satisfy the secured debt before obtaining execution on collateral, the
amount of the debt will determine whether execution on the collateral will
be economically worthwhile.74 In either case the unsecured creditor needs
to know the amount of the secured debt to decide whether to pursue its
claim against collateral, and means should exist by which an unsecured cred-
itor can extract an account from an uncooperative secured party. 75 Some
unsecured creditors could also benefit from means to obtain a hearing to
contest the secured party's priority.76 Finally, in the case of disposition by a
secured party, an unsecured creditor will want access to any proceeds re-
Earthmovers, Inc. v. Clarence L. Boyd Co., 554 P.2d 877, 878 (Okla. Ct. App. 1976) (bull-
dozer purchased within year for $14,365; repairing corporation recovered bulldozer from pond
and purchased it at sale foreclosing its mechanic's lien for price representing its repair bill,
$2,449) (see infra notes 225-37 and accompanying text); Murdock v. Blake, 26 Utah 2d 22, 484
P.2d 164, 166-67 (1971) (lien creditors purchased collateral with alleged fair market value of
$4,943 at their own execution sale for $2,822) (see supra note 7 and infra notes 171-77 and
accompanying texts).
73. Several Code provisions assure to the debtor or to junior secured parties help from a
senior secured party; these provisions might have assured the same help to lien creditors but do
not. Section 9-208 assures to the debtor, but not to a lien creditor, access to information from
the secured party about the amount of the indebtedness or about the collateral. See 1 G.
GILMORE, supra note 29, § 15.3, at 473. Under §§ 9-504(l)(c) and 9-504(2) a junior secured
party who has given written notice of its interest to a senior secured party foreclosing on the
collateral must be given notice by the senior secured party about the intended sale and will be
entitled to have any excess proceeds applied to its claim. No similar provision is made for
creditors. U.C.C. § 9-504(3) (1978) requires a secured party to send notice of sale to the
debtor and to the junior secured parties but not to other creditors; § 9-505(2) (1978) requires a
secured party to send notice of proposal to retain collateral in satisfaction of debt to the debtor
and to the junior secured parties but not to other creditors. See Wechsler, Rights and Reme-
dies of the Secured Party After an Unauthorized Transfer of Collateral: A Proposal for Balanc-
ing Competing Claims in Repossession, Resale, Proceeds, and Conversion Cases, 32 BUFFALO L.
REV. 373, 388 (1983) (lien creditor has no right under UCC to compel sale of collateral by
secured party that proposes to retain the collateral in satisfaction of secured debt); see also id.
at 393-94 (procedure should exist for hearing to resolve any priority dispute; if secured party
found to have priority, it should be compelled to dispose of collateral and to distribute pro-
ceeds to itself, junior secured parties, lien creditors, and the debtor, in that order); Henderson,
supra note 18, at 214-30 (lien creditor should have means to learn amount of remaining se-
cured debt; lien creditor should be able to obtain hearing to contest priority of security interest;
secured party should be required to make excess proceeds from disposition available to lien
creditors).
74. Generally, if the security interest is to be satisfied out of the proceeds of an execution
sale, the unsecured creditor will probably receive only what remains. If the security interest is
not to be satisfied out of the proceeds, the price paid for the collateral will probably be less,
reflecting the fact that the secured party may foreclose on the collateral in the purchaser's
hands.
75. See Henderson, supra note 18, at 214-16, 225.
76. For example, if the secured party had not properly perfected its interest before the
unsecured creditor obtained a lien against the collateral, under U.C.C. § 9-301(l)(b) (1978) the
unsecured creditor would have priority over the secured party.
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maining after satisfaction of the secured debt before the secured party re-
turns that remainder to the debtor.7 7
The Code sets forth some general purposes and policies, and one can infer
additional policies from the Code's provisions. The Code explicitly states
that its overall purposes and policies are to simplify, clarify, and modernize
the law of commercial transactions, to permit the continued expansion of
commercial practices, and to make the law uniform among the jurisdic-
tions.78 The comment to article 9 states that the article provides comprehen-
sive treatment for various species of security interests that formerly were
governed by different bodies of law.79 One purpose of article 9 is to create a
unified structure with a single filing system in order to enhance certainty and
reduce costs. 80
The overall plan of article 9 promotes efficient conduct of business by re-
warding providence and diligence. 81 Article 9 further promotes efficiency by
ensuring, the availability of information to those who have a legitimate need
for it.82 Article 9 reflects a policy favoring free alienability of property
rights.83 The article removes restrictions on debtors' ability to encumber or
transfer their interests in collateral.84 In particular, section 9-311 ensures
that a debtor cannot make himself judgment-proof merely by granting secur-
ity interests in all of his property.85
Thus, treatment of involuntary transfers under section 9-311 should bal-
ance a number of often incompatible interests and policy considerations.
Several features, however, appear generally desirable. First, treatment of in-
voluntary transfers should preserve as many of debtors' and secured parties'
rights under article 9 as possible.86 Second, any treatment should maximize
proceeds by offering clear title to prospective purchasers.87 Third, a treat-
ment should minimize costs and inconvenience. Fourth, parties should have
77. Cf. U.C.C. § 9-504(l)(c) (1972) (junior secured parties may submit claims against pro-
ceeds in hands of senior secured party).
78. U.C.C. § 1-102(l)-(3) and comment 1 (1972).
79. Id. § 9-101 comment 2 (1978).
80. Id.
81. Id. As in other recording systems, prompt filing is rewarded with priority unless over-
riding policy considerations are present. The rules governing priority are set forth in § 9-210
and in part III of article 9. For a discussion of economic justifications for article 9's priority
scheme, see generally Jackson & Kronman, supra note 44.
82. U.C.C. § 9-208 (1978) gives the debtor access to information from the secured party
about the amount of the indebtedness and the collateral covered by the security agreement.
Section 9-402 gives the requirements for information to be contained in the financing state-
ment, which is filed in a public record. See also 1 G. GILMORE, supra note 29, § 15.1.
83. See Henderson, supra note 18, at 197 (debtor's right to encumber everything he has or
ever will own and his right to transfer under § 9-311 exemplify theme of free alienability of
property rights).
84. Id.
85. Id.; see also Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. Pathological & Diagnostic Laboratories, Inc.,
11 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 386 (Callaghan) (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1972) (secured parties who were parents
of debtor could not shield debtor's assets from other creditors).
86. This statement assumes that the means and ends of article 9 are in fact desirable.
87. See Justice, supra note 4, at 434 (continuation of security interest in collateral may




access to information that pertains to their interests. For example, a secured
party should receive notice of a judgment creditor's intent to execute on
collateral, and a judgment creditor may want to know the amount of the
secured party's interest in the collateral.88 Fifth, treatment should not per-
mit a secured party to lock up any value in the collateral in excess of the
security interest; rather, that excess should be freely transferable.8 9 When
claims exist against the same property right, the conflict must be resolved on
the basis of policy considerations. 90 The treatments of involuntary transfers
under section 9-311 among the various jurisdictions effect various com-
promises among the competing concerns.
II. A SURVEY OF ALTERNATIVE TREATMENTS
A. Execution Cuts Off Security Interest in Collateral
Perhaps because the section states so little, courts and commentators have
tended to over-interpret section 9-311. Some early commentators construed
section 9-311 to void any provision in a security agreement making transfer
a default.91 The original version of section 9-306 appeared to support this
construction. Section 9-306 generally states that a secured party's interest
continues in both the collateral and in any identifiable proceeds after disposi-
tion of the collateral. 92 Before the 1972 Code revision section 9-306 referred
only to dispositions by the debtor.93 Thus, some courts concluded that sec-
tion 9-306 applied only in cases of voluntary transfers. 94 Doubt regarding
the continuation of a security interest under section 9-306 despite involun-
tary transfer may have exacerbated confusion about the effect of section 9-
311.95
The Delaware Supreme Court has held that execution at the instance of a
88. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
89. U.C.C. § 9-311 (1978) and comment. See Roehmer & Zeller, Inc. v. Ace Transmis-
sion Center, Inc., 114 Misc. 2d 415, 454 N.Y.S.2d 377, 378 (Sup. Ct. 1982) (secured party may
not unilaterally protect debtor's assets from seizure); Marine Midland Bank v. Conerty Pon-
tiac-Buick, Inc., 77 Misc. 2d 311, 352 N.Y.S.2d 953, 961 (Sup. Ct. 1974) (debtor cannot immu-
nize himself against subsequent creditors merely by agreeing to future advance clause in
security agreement).
90. See supra notes 78-85 and accompanying text.
91. See IND. CODE ANN. § 26-1-9-311 comment (Bums 1974); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 12A:9-
311 comment 1 (West 1962). Courts in Indiana and New Jersey, however, have followed the
better construction that § 9-311 does not void provisions making transfer a default. See Enloe
v. Franklin Bank & Trust Co., 445 N.E.2d 1005, 1010 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983); Poydan, Inc. v.
Agia Kiriaki, Inc., 130 N.J. Super. 141, 325 A.2d 838, 842-43 (Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1974), aftd,
139 N.J. Super. 365, 354 A.2d 99 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976). For discussion of why this
interpretation of § 9-311 is better, see Henderson, supra note 18, at 199. Two legislatures
statutorily validated provisions making transfer a default. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-
3132 (1967 & Supp. 1983-1984); CAL. COM. CODE § 9311 (West 1964 & Supp. 1984).
92. U.C.C. § 9-306 (1978).
93. See SELECTED COMMERCIAL STATUTES 834-37 (West 1983 ed.) (1972 revisions to
§ 9-306).
94. See Quigley v. Caron, 247 A.2d 94, 96 (Me. 1968); Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp. v.
Prudential Inv. Corp., 101 R.I. 287, 222 A.2d 571, 575 (1966). For a summary of this issue as
of the time of the 1972 article 9 revisions, see Hawkiand, The Proposed Amendments to Article
9 of the UC.C. Part II Proceeds, 77 CoM. L.J. 12 (1972).
95. See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
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judgment creditor terminates a security interest in collateral. 96 Delaware
adopted this approach on the ground that section 9-311 leaves state law free
to determine the appropriate process by which creditors may reach the
debtor's rights in the collateral. 97 Under prior Delaware law a purchaser at
an execution sale took title free of all liens or other interests.98 Thus, the
appropriate process in Delaware afforded no means for continuation of the
secured party's interest in the collateral.99 Although no other jurisdictions
follow this approach, a few courts have relegated the secured party to an
equally unfavorable position. A California court held that marshalling l o
applied to remove a security interest from collateral if necessary to enable a
junior creditor to satisfy its judgment, provided that no risk of loss was im-
posed on the senior secured party. 10 1
The Delaware approach offers several advantages. By offering prospective
buyers a clear title, the Delaware approach should enhance proceeds from
96. See Maryland Nat'l Bank v. Porter-Way Harvester Mfg. Co., 300 A.2d 8, 12 (Del.
1972). The court also distinguished its decision from other decisions by Florida and Wisconsin
courts on the ground that the legislatures in those states at the time of adoption of the Code
had enacted statutes to supplement § 9-311. Id. at 12; see Altec Lansing v. Friedman Sound,
Inc., 204 So. 2d 740, 741 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967) (FLA. STAT. § 679.9-203 (1966) creates
lien in favor of secured creditor); First Nat'l Bank v. Sheriff of Milwaukee County, 34 Wis. 2d
535, 149 N.W.2d 548, 550-51 (1967) (Wis. STAT. § 272.26 (1957) makes execution sale subject
to secured creditor's interest). Delaware, however, had also enacted supplementary legislation.
See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 9-306 (1974) (originally enacted in 1953).
97. Maryland Nat'l Bank v. Porter-Way Harvester Mfg. Co., 300 A.2d 8, 11 (Del. 1972).
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Marshalling involves ranking and disposing of competing claims or interests to secure
justice to all interested parties and to provide the largest possible satisfaction to each. The
equitable doctrine of marshalling holds that a creditor who has two funds available to satisfy
his debt may not defeat another creditor who has resort to only one fund. BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 878 (5th ed. 1979).
101. Shedoudy v. Beverly Surgical Supply Co., 100 Cal. App. 3d 730, 733, 161 Cal. Rptr.
164, 166 (1980). The court relied upon comment 3 to U.C.C. § 9-311, which states that when
the value of the collateral clearly exceeds the amount of the secured debt, then "[p]rocedures
such as marshalling may be appropriate." Id. at 736-37, 161 Cal. Rptr. at 168; U.C.C. § 9-311
comment 3 (1978). The Nebraska supreme court reached a different result regarding the use of
marshalling in Platte Valley Bank v. Kracl, 185 Neb. 168, 174 N.W.2d 724 (1970). In that
case the Nebraska court held that marshalling assets, thereby requiring a senior secured party
to look to other collateral rather than to the only collateral available to a junior creditor, is an
equitable doctrine that may not be invoked to defeat a secured party's statutory rights under
the UCC. 174 N.W.2d at 728. The court further held that a junior creditor may not invoke
the marshalling doctrine if the other collateral available to the secured party would not satisfy
either obligation and would inconvenience the secured party, deprive the secured party of its
rights under the contract, or require the secured party to undertake speculative, independent
legal action. Id. at 729; cf Kansas and New Hampshire statutes permitting judicial sale of the
collateral over a secured party's objection if the property can be sold for more than the total
claims against it, KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-2406 (1983); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 512.29
(1983).
Note that if a secured party fails to provide in the security agreement that transfer consti-
tutes a default, the secured party may lack a remedy when transfer occurs. See Production
Credit Ass'n v. Nowatzski, 90 Wis. 2d 344, 280 N.W.2d 118, 122 (1979) (U.C.C. § 9-311 does
not avoid provision making transfer a default; transferee takes subject to the secured party's
rights); Production Credit Ass'n v. Equity Coop. Livestock Sales Ass'n, 82 Wis. 2d 5, 261
N.W. 2d 127, 132 (1977) (if security agreement did not provide that sale of collateral consti-
tuted default, secured party did not have right to immediate possession).
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the sale of collateral.10 2 The approach attains the goal of section 9-311 to
allow alienation of the debtor's rights in the collateral.103 Unlike the Dela-
ware approach, treatments that give the secured party a continuing interest
in the collateral permit subsequent actions of the purchaser to affect detri-
mentally the secured party's interest and the debtor's liability for any defi-
ciency.'1 4 Furthermore, disruption of the purchaser's enjoyment of the
property may occur under non-Delaware approaches if the debtor defaults
or the secured party elects to foreclose under the security agreement. 10 5
Since the Delaware approach permits the secured party to look only to the
debtor for any deficiency, the subsequent interests of the secured party, the
debtor, and the purchaser do not depend on the conduct of others.
The Delaware approach, however, deprives the secured party of most of
its rights under part V of article 9. Part V gives the secured party the follow-
ing remedies: 10 6 the secured party may foreclose its interest in the collateral
by means of judicial process;10 7 the secured party may take collections from
account debtors' 08 or obligors' °9 or take control of proceeds; 110 the secured
party may take possession of the collateral without judicial process;"' the
secured party may dispose of the collateral in a commercially reasonable
manner;11 2 or the secured party may propose to retain the collateral in satis-
faction of the secured obligation. 13
Thus, under part V the secured party largely controls the time, place, and
102. See Maryland Nat'l Bank v. Porter-Way Harvester Mfg. Co., 300 A.2d 8, 10 (Del.
1972); supra note 87 and accompanying text.
103. See U.C.C. § 9-311 comment 1 (1978).
104. If the purchaser damages or disappears with the collateral, foreclosure of the security
interest will either bring less proceeds or be impossible. In either case, since the debtor usually
remains liable for the debt, the secured party may look to the debtor for any deficiency
although the debtor might have been discharged had the secured party been able to satisfy the
debt out of the collateral. Cf. Nickles, supra note 5, at 516-20 (rights after repossession).
105. The debtor remains liable under the security agreement. The secured party must look
first to the debtor for satisfaction of any part of the secured obligation outstanding. Legg v.
Kelly, 412 So. 2d 1202, 1205 (Ala. 1982); Clark Jewelers v. Satterthwaite, 8 Kan. App. 2d 569,
662 P.2d 1301, 1304 (1983); Smiley & Wheeler, 602 P.2d 209, 212 (Okla. 1979). In the likely
event that the debtor fails to make payments on collateral that he no longer possesses, the
secured party may foreclose its interest in the collateral in the purchaser's hands. E.g., Mid-
land-Guardian Co. v. Hagin, 370 So. 2d 25, 27 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979); Enloe v. Franklin
Bank & Trust Co., 445 N.E.2d 1005, 1008 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983); Powell v. Whirlpool Employ-
ees Fed. Credit Union, 42 Mich. App. 228, 201 N.W.2d 683, 685 (1972). One court has stated
that a secured party may foreclose its security interest in collateral in the hands of a purchaser
if the secured party cannot or will not recover the balance owed from the debtor. Cooper v.
Citizens Bank, 129 Ga. App. 261, 199 S.E.2d 369, 372 (1973).
106. These remedies apply on default by the debtor. See supra note 18 for standard events
of default.
107. U.C.C. § 9-501 (1978).
108. An account debtor is a person who is obligated on an account, chattel paper, contract
right, or general intangible. U.C.C. § 9-105(l)(a) (1978).
109. An obligor is a promisor; the person who has committed to perform some obligation.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 971 (5th ed. 1979).
110. U.C.C. § 9-502 (1978).
111. Id. § 9-503.
112. Id. § 9-504.




manner of disposition. Alternatively, the secured party may keep the collat-
eral under certain conditions. In either case the secured party can minimize
its risk, expense, and inconvenience. The law provides the secured party
with these rights because, unlike the unsecured creditor, the secured party
exercised sufficient providence to obtain a security interest before extending
itself for the debtor's sake. The Delaware approach, by depriving the se-
cured party of its part V rights, both works an injustice against the secured
party and disrupts the overall plan of article 9.114 A factor mitigating the
apparent harshness of the Delaware treatment toward the secured party is
that a creditor is unlikely to press for execution on the collateral unless the
creditor expects the execution sale to produce more than enough to satisfy
the secured debt.' 15 The large majority of states decline to treat the secured
party so harshly, as the discussions of the remaining treatments under sec-
tion 9-311 will reveal.
B. Unsecured Creditor Must First Pay Secured Debt
Several states provide that a secured party cannot prevent execution on
the collateral, but an unsecured creditor must pay the secured debt in order
to obtain execution.'1 6 Statutes in these states afford desirable procedural
devices. For example, an Idaho statute provides that an unsecured creditor
may take physical possession of collateral if he obtains the written consent of
the secured party. 117 If the secured party does not consent, the attaching
creditor must tender the amount of the secured obligation to the secured
party before a sheriff may take possession of the collateral. 118 Once the cred-
itor pays the debt, the creditor is subrogated"19 to the rights of the secured
party under the security agreement. 120 Alternatively, the creditor may at-
tach the debtor's equity of redemption without taking possession of the col-
lateral by serving notice on the secured party, the debtor, and the party in
possession, 121 and by filing notice in the same place where filing is required
to perfect a security interest. 122
114. See supra notes 78-85 and accompanying text.
115. Since the secured party will take priority in the distribution of any proceeds, if no
excess is realized over the amount of the secured obligation, the lien creditor will gain nothing
for its trouble.
116. Idaho, Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts, and New Hampshire follow this treatment. See
statutes cited infra notes 117-18, 120-24.
117. IDAHO CODE § 8-506A(b) (1979). For a detailed discussion of Idaho statutes gov-
erning transfers within U.C.C. § 9-311, see Henderson, supra note 18, at 210-33.
118. IDAHO CODE § 8-506A(b) (1979).
119. Subrogation is the substitution of one person in the place of another in such a manner
that the one person succeeds to the rights of the other in relation to a lawful claim and its
remedies. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1279 (5th ed. 1979).
120. IDAHO CODE § 8-506A(b) (1979).
121. Id. § 8-506A(c). The statute accommodates the possibility that someone other than
the debtor may have possession of the collateral; e.g., a lessee from the debtor.
122. Id. Similarly, Iowa statutes provide that an unsecured creditor must pay off a security
interest within ten days after levying on the collateral. IOWA CODE ANN. § 626.34.41 (West
1950 & Supp. 1984-1985). New Hampshire provides that a creditor may obtain execution on
collateral if he pays off the secured debt. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 511:26 (1983). In Massa-
chusetts a secured party may demand payment of its secured debt within a reasonable time
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Statutes in other states furnish other useful devices. Two states provide
that an unsecured creditor may require a secured party to give an account of
the remaining secured debt. 123 One state provides that if the sheriff sells the
collateral for less than the amount owed to the secured party plus costs of
process, the creditor is liable for the deficiency. 124 If the sale yields a sur-
plus, however, the surplus belongs to the secured party. 125 A New York
court took a similar approach in Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Shapiro.126 In
that case the secured party secured a loan to the debtor with an interest in a
1977 Continental Mark V. The City of New York Parking Violations Bu-
reau obtained a judgment against the debtor for $12,465 for outstanding
parking tickets and levied on the car. The claims against the car, however,
exceeded the car's value. The court held that the Parking Violations Bureau
must either yield possession of the car to the secured party or pay off the
secured debt before applying any remaining proceeds from its sale to satisfy
the lien. 127
Apart from the fact that none of the above schemes supplies all procedural
needs, the schemes raise two concerns. First, enabling a subordinate credi-
tor to extinguish a security interest by paying off the secured debt partly
abrogates the secured party's rights under article 9.128 Given the conflicting
interests involved, however, this treatment does not unreasonably compro-
mise the secured party's interests. 129 Second, some legitimate creditors may
not have the resources to pay off the secured debt in advance.' 30 Such credi-
tors already may have incurred expenses in carrying and pursuing an unpaid
debt and may be unwilling or unable to stake additional funds or credit on
less than certain proceeds. 3 1  Yet the credit extended by these creditors
indirectly may have helped to enhance the secured party's position.1 32
This treatment, however, has considerable virtues. First, the treatment
protects the interests of the secured party and the debtor relatively well. 133
after attachment. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 223, § 75 (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1974). The attach-
ing creditor must tender the amount of the debt within ten days of the secured party's demand.
Id. § 74.
123. IOWA CODE ANN. 626.42 (West 1950 & Supp. 1984-1985); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 511:27 (1983).
124. IOWA CODE ANN. § 626.41 (West 1950 & Supp. 1984-1985).
125. Id. Under U.C.C. § 9-504(2) (1978) the secured party must account to the debtor for
any surplus proceeds from a disposition. Section 9-504 does not state whether the secured
party must account only after a disposition by the secured party under § 9-504 or also after a
disposition by a third party, but the former interpretation seems most likely.
126. N.Y.L.J., Mar. 14, 1979, at 10, col. 2 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.).
127. Id.
128. See supra notes 107-13 and accompanying text.
129. Since U.C.C. § 9-504(2) requires the secured party to account to the debtor for any
excess proceeds if the secured party disposes of the collateral, the secured party cannot gain by
personally disposing of the collateral instead of receiving payment from a lien creditor. Given
that § 9-311 precludes a secured party from shielding a debtor altogether from the claims of
other creditors unless the secured party undertakes to pay off other creditors' claims, requiring
a lien creditor to pay off the secured debt is fair to the secured party.
130. See supra note 69 and accompanying text; Henderson, supra note 18, at 213-14.
131. Henderson, supra note 18, at 194, 213-14.
132. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
133. See supra notes 54-90 and accompanying text.
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Second, provisions permitting an unsecured creditor to obtain an account of
the remaining secured debt further equity and economy by ensuring that
unsecured creditors will neither pursue nor abandon claims unnecessarily.
Third, by permitting the execution purchaser to take clear title, this treat-
ment minimizes complexity of relations among the parties. 134  Finally, at
least theoretically, an unsecured creditor may reach excess value 135 in the
collateral if both the existence of the excess and the creditor's entitlement to
the excess can be readily established.
136
C. Secured Party Can Prevent Execution, but May Be Compelled to
Liquidate
In two cases a secured party successfully prevented execution, but the
court required the secured party to dispose of the collateral. In North Bank
v. F & H Resources, Inc. 137 the court held that the trial court had authority
under Illinois procedural law to order a secured party to sell the collateral
and to distribute the proceeds first to itself in satisfaction of the secured debt,
then to costs, and finally to judgment creditors.1 3 8 The court also held that
the supplementary proceeding 139 out of which the order issued constituted
"other judicial process" within the meaning of section 9-311.14O
In American Heritage Bank & Trust v. 0. & E., Inc. 141 the debtor, a wine
shop, granted to a senior secured party an interest in the shop's present or
future inventory, furniture, fixtures, and equipment. Subsequently, the
debtor defaulted on obligations to both the senior and a junior secured party.
The junior secured party took possession of the shop 14 2 and continued to
operate it, failing to notify the senior secured party that the junior secured
party proposed to retain the collateral.143 The appellate court held that the
senior secured party must sell the collateral and apply the proceeds first to
costs, then to satisfaction of its interest, and finally to the interest of the
134. The Delaware treatment also offers this advantage. See supra notes 102-05 and ac-
companying text for explanation.
135. Excess value refers to value in the collateral in excess of the amount of the remaining
secured debt.
136. Theoretically, a creditor who establishes the existence of substantial value in property
on which he intends to execute and his entitlement to satisfy a claim out of the proceeds could
obtain a loan on that basis to pay off the secured party's interest.
137. 53 11. App. 3d 950, 369 N.E.2d 174 (1977).
138. 369 N.E.2d at 176.
139. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, § 73 (Smith-Hurd 1968 & Supp. 1983-1984) (supple-
mentary proceedings whereby judgment creditor may discover and reach debtor's assets).
140. 369 N.E.2d at 177. The secured obligation was in the form of demand notes that
could be called in at any time. Id. at 176. A demand note is a note containing the uncondi-
tional promise of the maker to pay a sum certain in money on the demand of the payee.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 956 (5th ed. 1979).
141. 40 Colo. App. 306, 576 P.2d 566 (1978).
142. The junior secured party exercised this right under U.C.C. § 9-503 (1978).
143. 576 P.2d at 568. Under U.C.C. § 9-505 (1978) a secured party may propose to retain
the collateral in satisfaction of the obligation rather than dispose of it. Generally, if a secured
party wishes to dispose of the collateral, it must give written notice to the debtor and to any
other secured party from whom it has received written notice of a claim in the collateral.
U.C.C. § 9-505(2) (1978).
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junior secured party. 144
Several points remain unanswered by these two cases. If the proceeds do
not satisfy the senior secured obligation, the holdings do not indicate
whether the security interest continues in the collateral in the hands of the
purchaser or terminates. 145 If the security interest terminates, a further is-
sue arises as to whether the secured party would have any recourse against
either the judgment creditor or the debtor for the deficiency.146
Assuming that sale by the secured party will bring a return as large or
larger than an execution sale would have produced and that the proceeds
will satisfy the secured debt, compelling the secured party to dispose of the
collateral has several advantages. Disposition by the secured party is just as
neat as by a lien creditor under the Delaware approach. 147 Under section 9-
504(4)148 a purchaser takes all of the debtor's rights, and the sale discharges
the secured party's interest and all subordinate interests. This treatment
protects the interests of the secured party and the debtor reasonably well. 149
The secured party retains its rights under article 9 to control disposition of
the collateral. 150 This treatment, by compelling the secured party to dispose
of the collateral, avoids requiring a judgment creditor to produce a large
amount of cash in advance of sale to pay off the security interest. 151 Most of
these advantages, however, obtain only if the value of the collateral exceeds
the amount of the secured debt.
D. Transfer Is Subject to the Security Interest
In the large majority of states a secured party cannot prevent voluntary or
involuntary transfer of the collateral, but transfer is subject to the security
interest. 52 The meaning of "subject to" varies. The remedies sought and the
144. 576 P.2d at 568. The court prescribed a different order of priority for distribution of
proceeds than in North Bank.
145. If treated as a transfer within § 9-311, the security interest should continue in the
collateral under § 9-306. If treated as a disposition by the secured party within § 9-504, the
purchaser should take free of the security interest under § 9-504(4), and the secured party
would have recourse against the debtor for any deficiency under § 9-504(2). See KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 60-2406 (1983) (if secured party objects to execution at the instance of a judgment
creditor, sale shall not be completed unless for an amount in excess of the senior interest as
determined by the court).
146. Cf. IOWA CODE ANN. § 626.41 (West 1950 & Supp. 1984-1985) (if execution sale does
not yield enough to pay secured debt, interest, and costs of sale, judgment creditor shall be
liable for deficiency).
147. See supra notes 104-05 and accompanying text.
148. U.C.C. § 9-504(4) (1978).
149. See supra notes 54-65 and accompanying text.
150. See supra notes 107-13 and accompanying text.
151. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
152. See Citizens Bank v. Perrin & Sons, Inc., 253 Ark. 639, 488 S.W.2d 14, 15 (1972); El
Paso County Bank v. Charles R. Milisen & Co., 622 P.2d 594, 596 (Colo. Ct. App. 1980);
Midland Guardian Co. v. Hagin, 370 So. 2d 25, 27 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979); Cooper v.
Citizens Bank, 129 Ga. App. 261, 199 S.E.2d 369, 372 (1973); IDAHO CODE § 8-506A, 11-203
(1979); Decatur Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Murphy, 119 I11. App. 3d 277, 456 N.E.2d 267, 274
(1983); Clark Jewelers v. Satterthwaite, 8 Kan. App. 2d 569, 662 P.2d 1301, 1304 (1983);
Powell v. Whirlpool Employees Fed. Credit Union, 42 Mich. App. 228, 201 N.W.2d 683, 685
(1972); Memphis Bank & Trust Co. v. Pate, 362 So. 2d 1245, 1247 (Miss. 1978); Sturdevant v.
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particular facts of each case shape the holdings.1 53 Some decisions merely
state that the transferee takes no more than the debtor had or that the trans-
fer is subject to the secured party's interest.1 54 A majority of courts, how-
ever, have clearly indicated that a secured party may enforce its interest in
collateral in the hands of an execution purchaser 55 or the debtor's
transferee. 156
El Paso County Bank v. Charles R. Milisen & Co. 157 illustrates this ap-
proach. In Milisen the debtor entered a security agreement with El Paso
County Bank. The secured debt exceeded $45,000, and the collateral in-
cluded all of the debtor's accounts receivable. Subsequently, another credi-
tor of the debtor, Charles R. Milisen & Co., obtained a judgment against the
debtor and served a writ of garnishment on a party that owed $4,247 on
account to the debtor. El Paso notified the trial court presiding over the
garnishment proceedings of its security interest in all of the debtor's ac-
First Sec. Bank, 186 Mont. 91, 606 P.2d 525, 528 (1980); Shaw Mudge & Co. v. Sher-Mart
Mfg. Co., 132 N.J. Super. 517, 334 A.2d 357, 360 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1975); Ryan v. Ro-
land, 434 F.2d 353, 357 (10th Cir. 1970) (applying New Mexico law); Georgia-Pacific Corp. v.
Lumber Prods. Co., 590 P.2d 661, 665 (Okla. 1979); Fliegel v. Associates Capital Co., 272 Or.
434, 537 P.2d 1144, 1148 (1975); Mammoth cave Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Oldham, 569 S.W.2d
833, 836 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1977); Goetz v. Goetz, 567 S.W.2d 892, 895 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas
1978, no writ); Murdock v. Blake, 26 Utah 2d 22, 484 P.2d 164, 168-69 (1971); Production
Credit Ass'n v. Nowatzski, 90 Wis. 2d 344, 280 N.W.2d 118, 121 (1979).
153. Secured parties have brought actions for discharge or vacation of levy (Shaw Mudge
& Co. v. Sher-Mart Mfg. Co., Inc., 132 N.J. Super. 517, 334 A.2d 357, 358 (Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1975); William Iselin & Co. v. Burgess & Leigh, Ltd., 52 Misc. 2d 821, 276 N.Y.S.2d 659,
660-61 (Sup. Ct. 1967)), for replevin (Midland-Guardian Co. v. Hagin, 370 So. 2d 25, 26 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1979); Platte Valley Bank v. Kracl, 185 Neb. 168, 174 N.W.2d 724, 726 (1970);
Roemer & Zeller, Inc. v. Ace Transmission Center, Inc., 114 Misc. 2d 415, 451 N.Y.S.2d 601
(Sup. Ct. 1982); Karp Bros., Inc. v. West Ward Savings & Loan Ass'n, 440 Pa. 583, 271 A.2d
493, 494 (1970)), for conversion (Cooper v. Citizens Bank, 129 Ga. App. 261, 199 S.E.2d 369,
370 (1973); National Shawmut Bank v. Vera, 352 Mass. 1, 223 N.E.2d 515, 515-16 (1967);
Farmers State Bank v. Stewart, 454 S.W.2d 908, 909 (Mo. 1970); Mammoth Cave Prod. Credit
Ass'n v. Oldham, 569 S.W.2d 833, 835 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1977); Murdock v. Blake, 26 Utah 2d
22, 484 P.2d 164, 166 (1971); Production Credit Ass'n v. Nowatzski, 90 Wis. 2d 344, 280
N.W.2d 118, 120 (1979)), and on a written instrument (Clark Jewelers v. Satterthwaite, 8 Kan.
App. 2d 569, 662 P.2d 1301, 1303 (1983)).
154. Clark Jewelers v. Satterthwaite, 8 Kan. App. 2d 569, 662 P.2d 1301, 1304 (1983);
Memphis Bank & Trust Co. v. Pate, 362 So. 2d 1245, 1247 (Miss. 1978); Goetz v. Goetz, 567
S.W.2d 892, 895 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1978, no writ).
155. See, e.g., Citizens Bank v. Perrin & Sons, Inc., 253 Ark. 639, 488 S.W.2d 14, 15 (1972)
(since secured party could foreclose interest in tractor in hands of execution purchaser, bank
that obtained execution held not liable to secured party for conversion); Midland-Guardian
Co. v. Hagin, 370 So. 2d 25, 27 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979) (assignee of secured party entitled to
replevy mobile home from purchaser at public sale); Cooper v. Citizens Bank, 129 Ga. App.
261, 199 S.E.2d 369, 372 (1973) (although purchaser not liable for conversion, secured party
may foreclose its interest in automobile in hands of purchaser); Powell v. Whirlpool Employ-
ees Fed. Credit Union, 42 Mich. App. 228, 201 N.W.2d 683, 685 (1972) (secured party entitled
to claim truck since execution sale purchaser takes no more than debtor had and has duty to
make reasonable inquiry).
156. See, e.g., Houchen v. First Nat'l Bank, 445 F. Supp. 665, 669-70 (S.D. Ill. 1977) (se-
cured party may foreclose interest in assets of grocery store since debtor's transferee takes no
more than debtor had and has duty to inquire into source of title); Sturdevant v. First Sec.
Bank, 186 Mont. 91, 606 P.2d 525, 528 (1980) (secured party may foreclose interest in airplane
because purchaser from debtor took subject to security interest).
157. 622 P.2d 594 (Colo. Ct. App. 1981).
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counts receivable. 158 The trial court ordered the $4,247 to be paid to
Milisen and refused to allow El Paso to intervene in the proceedings. 159 The
appellate court held that El Paso's security interest followed the collat-
eral. 160 The appellate court cited section 9-311 in its rationale, but stated
that the section did not defeat the interest of a senior party.161 Under sec-
tion 9-306, according to the appellate court, the security interest continued
in the collateral despite transfer. 162 The court also noted that the 1972 revi-
sion to section 9-306 broadened that section to include transfers effected by
persons other than the debtor. 163 In ruling for El Paso' 64 the court did not
consider if or how Milisen might have reached any excess value if the
amount of the account receivable had exceeded the amount of El Paso's se-
curity interest.
In cases holding that transfer is subject to a security interest either a
debtor had already defaulted on his obligations to a secured party at the time
of an attempted transfer or the attempted transfer itself constituted a default
under a provision in the security agreement. The secured party's right to
foreclose its interest in collateral in the hands of the transferee arises from
default by the debtor, although courts do not always state this fact. 165 In a
related group of cases courts held that unauthorized transfer coupled with
default entitled the secured party to recover for conversion of the collat-
eral. 166 Courts have allowed claims for conversion against a lien creditor,167
a factor 168 of the debtor, 169 and a purchaser of the collateral. 170
158. An account receivable is a claim of an enterprise against a debtor, usually for sales or
services rendered, arising in the course of business and not supported by commercial paper.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 17 (5th ed. 1979).
159. The trial court denied El Paso's motion to intervene on the ground that it was not
timely. 622 P.2d at 595.
160. Id. at 596. Although Colorado law permitted a party claiming an interest in property
being garnished to intervene if it did so prior to conclusion of the garnishment proceedings,
COLO. R. Civ. P. 103(m) (Supp. 1984), the party was not required to do so and was free to
seek enforcement of its interest by other means. 622 P.2d at 596.
161. 622 P.2d at 596.
162. Id.
163. Id.; see U.C.C. § 9-306 comment 3 (1978). For 1972 revision, see supra note 26.
164. 622 P.2d at 596.
165. See Production Credit Ass'n v. Equity Coop Livestock Sales Ass'n, 82 Wis. 2d 5, 261
N.W.2d 127, 132 n.19 (1978) (since security agreement did not make transfer a default, secur-
ity interest continues in collateral despite transfer, leaving secured party without present rem-
edy against either debtor or transferee).
166. See Empire Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 26 Ariz. App. 157, 546 P.2d
1166, 1168 (1976); Cooper v. Citizens Bank, 129 Ga. App. 261, 199 S.E.2d 369, 371 (1973);
Farmers State Bank v. Stewart, 454 S.W.2d 908, 915 (Mo. 1970); Smith v. Guzman, N.Y.L.J.,
Feb. 14, 1975, at 17, col. 5 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.); First Pa. Banking & Trust Co. v. Liberati, 422
A.2d 1074, 1077 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1980) (dictum); Mammoth Cave Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Old-
ham, 569 S.W.2d 833, 838 (Tenn. 1977); Murdock v. Blake, 26 Utah 2d 22, 484 P.2d 164, 169
(1971); Production Credit Ass'n v. Nowatzski, 90 Wis. 2d 344, 280 N.W.2d 118, 122 (1979).
167. See Empire Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 26 Ariz. App. 157, 546 P.2d
1166, 1168 (1976); Murdock v. Blake, 26 Utah 2d 22, 484 P.2d 164, 169 (1971).
168. A factor is a commercial agent employed by a principal to sell on behalf of the princi-
pal, but usually in the factor's name, merchandise consigned to the factor and entrusted to his
possession and control of the goods, and being remunerated by a commission. BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 532 (5th ed. 1979).
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Murdock v. Blake171 typifies the reasoning in these cases. In Murdock the
debtor leased a service station from the secured party. Defendants, un-
secured creditors of the debtor, obtained a judgment against him for $5,204
and levied on assets from the service station. The secured party notified the
defendants that it had a prior perfected security interest in the assets. Nev-
ertheless, the defendants proceeded to sell the assets for $2,821. The secured
party alleged that the market value of the assets at the time of the sale was
$4,942. The court noted section 9-311,172 but construed the section in the
light of section 9-503,173 which gives the secured party the right to take
possession of the collateral on default by the debtor. 174 The debtor had de-
faulted on his obligations to the secured party prior to the time the defend-
ants obtained their judgment against the debtor. Therefore, under the
security agreement and section 9-503, the secured party had an immediate
right to possession. 175 Utah law provides that one who has an immediate
right to possession of property may recover for conversion against another
who has exercised unauthorized acts of dominion over the property. 176 The
court thus concluded that the secured party could recover damages from the
defendants for conversion, measured by the value of the collateral at the time
of the sale. 177
Some authorities argue that a finding of tortious liability based on mere
transfer of the collateral conflicts with the policy of section 9-311.178 Apart
from arguably inappropriate overtones of wrongdoing, however, the conver-
sion action serves an important function. 179 Furthermore, the action meshes
well with article 9. Like section 9-202 of article 9, the conversion action
169. Farmers State Bank v. Stewart, 454 S.W.2d 908, 915-16 (Mo. 1970); Mammoth Cave
Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Oldham, 569 S.W.2d 833, 840 (Tenn. 1977).
170. Smith v. Guzman, N.Y.L.J., Feb. 14, 1975, at 17, col. 5 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.); Production
Credit Ass'n v. Nowatzski, 90 Wis. 2d 344, 280 N.W.2d 118, 123 (1979).
171. 26 Utah 2d 22, 484 P.2d 164 (1971).
172. 484 P.2d at 168.
173. Id. at 169.
174. U.C.C. § 9-503 (1978).
175. 484 P.2d at 169.
176. Id. at 169.
177. Id. at 169-70.
178. See Henderson, supra note 18, at 209-10, 233 (transfer without more not a wrongful
conversion); Justice, supra note 4, at 441-43 (since execution sale authorized by § 9-311 cannot
be wrongful, conversion remedy should apply only to interferences with right of possession
sufficiently serious to justify forcing defendant to pay for the property); Wechsler, supra note
73, at 402, 409-12 (conversion recovery from purchasers of collateral too harsh because some
purchasers may have no opportunity to learn of security interest). In support of this argu-
ment, Wechsler cites § 9-302(1)(d) (security interest in consumer goods may be perfected with-
out filing); however, under § 307(2) in many cases a buyer of consumer goods takes free of a
security interest, despite perfection, if he buys without actual knowledge of the security inter-
est, unless the secured party has filed a financing statement. Article 9 is generally consistent in
tying priority to opportunity for others to learn of that priority.
179. When a lien creditor chooses to execute on collateral in disregard of a perfected secur-
ity interest, the secured party should be able to force the lien creditor to buy out the secured
party's interest in the collateral. The secured party's recovery, however, arguably should ex-
tend only to the amount of the security interest and not to the full market value, including any
value corresponding to the debtor's interest in the collateral. For further discussion of this
issue, see infra notes 230-33 and accompanying text.
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disregards the issue of title.180 In addition, the action provides a remedy
based on a present right to possession, which section 9-503 furnishes to the
secured party on default by the debtor.18 1 Absent a default under the terms
of the security agreement, however, the secured party has no right under
article 9 to take possession and therefore should not recover for
conversion. 182
In the preceding cases involving transfers subject to a security interest
transfer had already occurred and the secured party sought to enforce its
interest in the hands of the transferee or to recover damages. In a last group
of cases the secured party sought the court's aid to prevent execution on the
collateral before transfer. The courts in these cases, although stating that
any transfer would be subject to the secured party's interest, held that the
secured party could not prevent execution on the collateral.18 3 The value of
the collateral in these cases usually exceeded the amount of the secured
obligation.
Persuasive reasons have led a majority of jurisdictions to hold that collat-
eral remains subject to a security interest after transfer.18 4 These reasons
arise from both doctrinal and policy considerations. Several sections in arti-
cle 9 furnish doctrinal support for holding that a section 9-311 transfer is
subject to a security interest. First, section 9-402(7)185 states that a filed
financing statement remains effective despite transfer by the debtor. 186 Since
an effective financing statement would serve no function if transfer defeated
the interest that the financing statement recorded, this section reinforces the
inference from section 9-306 that a security interest continues in the collat-
180. U.C.C. § 9-202 (1978) states that the provisions of article 9 regarding obligations,
rights, and remedies apply whether the secured party or the debtor holds title to the collateral.
The tort of conversion constitutes a major interference with a chattel, so serious as to justify
forced sale to the defendant. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 80 (4th ed.
1971). Historically, title to the chattel has been irrelevant, and a chattel mortgagee or condi-
tional seller has had standing to recover in conversion after default by the debtor. W. PROSSER
& P. KEETON, PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS § 15, at 102-04 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter cited
as PROSSER & KEETON].
181. U.C.C. § 9-503 (1978). To recover in conversion the plaintiff must establish right of
possession of the chattel at the time of the conversion. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 180, at
102. The most common variety of conversion involves the unauthorized transfer of possession
of goods to one not entitled to them. Id. at 96. Such a transfer usually constitutes a serious
interference with the plaintiff's right to control the goods, since the defendant has "'set the
goods afloat upon a sea of strangers' "; good faith does not excuse the defendant. Id. (no
source given for quotation). For a discussion of how to measure damages for conversion, see
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 927(l)(a) (1976) (damages measured by value of the
subject matter converted or of the plaintiff's interest in it).
182. See Production Credit Ass'n v. Nowatzski, 90 Wis. 2d 344, 280 N.W.2d 118, 122
(1979).
183. See Dick Warner Cargo Handling Corp. v. Aetna Business Credit, Inc., 700 F.2d 858,
861 (2d Cir. 1983) (applying Connecticut law); New Jersey Bank v. Community Ass'n/Farms,
666 F.2d 813, 818 (3d Cir. 1981) (applying New Jersey law); U. S. Indus., Inc. v. Gregg, 540
F.2d 142, 146 (3d Cir. 1976) (applying Florida law); Roemer & Zeller, Inc. v. Ace Transmis-
sion Center, Inc., 114 Misc. 2d 415, 451 N.Y.S.2d 601, 603 (Sup. Ct. 1982); Lipkowitz & Plaut
v. Affrunti, 95 Misc. 2d 849, 407 N.Y.S.2d 1010, 1014 (Sup. Ct. 1978); Production Credit
Ass'n v. Nowatzski, 90 Wis. 2d 344, 280 N.W.2d 118, 122 (1979).
184. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.




eral despite transfer.187 As in section 9-306, however, the language in sec-
tion 9-402(7) does not clearly indicate whether a security interest continues
despite involuntary transfer.188 Second, section 9-503, which gives the se-
cured party the right to take possession of the collateral on default by the
debtor, makes no exceptions for cases in which the collateral has been trans-
ferred.189 Thus, courts have construed the section to support the secured
party's rights against lien creditors or transferees in actions for replevin or
conversion.190 Although the language in sections 9-306, 9-402(7), and 9-503
does not unequivocally include involuntary as well as voluntary transfers,
this omission probably results from oversight rather than design.' 91 Third,
section 9-307(3) provides additional doctrinal support for the survival of a
security interest despite transfer. Section 9-307(3) states that a buyer other
than a buyer in ordinary course 192 takes collateral free of any security inter-
est to the extent that the interest secures advances after the secured party
learns of the purchase, or more than forty-five days after the purchase,
whichever occurs first. 193 This provision negatively implies that a buyer not
in ordinary course otherwise takes subject to a security interest.
Section 9-311, however, provides the strongest doctrinal support for con-
cluding that a security interest continues in the collateral despite involuntary
transfer. In stating that only the debtor's rights may be transferred by vol-
untary or involuntary means, the section indicates that the secured party's
interest in the collateral should not terminate as under the Delaware ap-
proach.1 94 The language of section 9-311, however, does not preclude re-
quiring the unsecured creditor to pay off the secured debt before
execution 95 or compelling the secured party to liquidate, 196 treatments dis-
cussed previously in this Comment.
Policy considerations support the "subject to" approach less strongly than
187. See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
188. U.C.C. § 9-402(7) (1978).
189. Id. § 9-503.
190. See, e.g., Midland-Guardian Co. v. Hagin, 370 So. 2d 25, 27 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979)
(secured party or its assignee has right of replevin under § 9-503); Farmers State Bank v.
Stewart, 454 S.W.2d 908, 916 (Mo. 1970) (secured party has right to possession under § 9-503
and thus may sue auctioneer for conversion); State v. Jones, 181 N.J. Super. 549, 438 A.2d
581, 586 (Super. Ct. Law Div. 1981) (under § 9-503 secured party may repossess car from state
on debtor's default); Paccar Fin. Corp. v. Harnett Transfer, Inc., 51 N.C. App. 1, 275 S.E.2d
243, 248 (under § 9-503 secured party has right to possession on debtor's default and thus may
obtain claim and delivery from buyer at public sale); Production Credit Ass'n v. Nowatzski, 90
Wis. 2d 344, 280 N.W.2d 118, 122 (1979) (§ 9-503, giving secured party right to possession on
debtor's default, shows that § 9-311 does not void provision in security agreement making
unauthorized transfer a default).
191. Cf. Hawkland, supra note 94, at 12-13 (policy reasons for including involuntary
dispositions).
192. U.C.C. § 1-201(9) (1978) provides a detailed definition of a buyer in ordinary course.
Generally, a buyer in ordinary course is one who buys goods in good faith and without knowl-
edge of any third party's interest in the goods from a seller in the business of selling goods of
that kind.
193. U.C.C. § 9-307(3) (1978).
194. See supra text accompanying notes 91-115.
195. See supra text accompanying notes 116-36.
196. See supra text accompanying notes 137-51.
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other treatments. Although the "subject to" approach preserves all of the
secured party's rights under article 9, the secured party may prefer a differ-
ent treatment because the continuation of its interest in the collateral despite
a number of voluntary and involuntary transfers creates a potentially un-
wieldy situation. 197 The purchaser of the collateral may lose possession if
197. Consecutive transfers of the whole collateral may cause difficulty to the secured party
in pursuing its interest in collateral in the hands of the transferees and in the enforcement of
contractual rights and duties under the original security agreement. Another potential source
of complexity is transfer of subsets of rights in collateral. U.C.C. § 1-201(36) (1978) defines
"right" by stating that the term includes remedies. Id. § 1-201(34) defines "remedy" as any
remedial right to which a party is entitled with or without resort to a tribunal. Id. § 2-201
comment 34 merely adds that the purpose of the section is to clarify that "rights" and "reme-
dies" include the self-help remedies given by the Code. The Code does not define "rights in the
collateral." Id. § 9-203 states that the debtor must have rights in the collateral in order for a
security agreement to become enforceable. The general rule given by the cases is that, for
purposes of § 9-203, possession by the debtor coupled with at least contingent rights of owner-
ship constitute rights in the collateral. See, e.g., Amfac Mortgage Corp. v. Arizona Mall, 127
Ariz. 70, 618 P.2d 240, 244 (Ct. App. 1980) (construction lender prevailed over subcontractor
because debtor had obtained possession pursuant to agreement); Morton Booth Co. v. Tiara
Furniture, Inc., 564 P.2d 210, 214 (Okla. 1977) (rights sufficient for attachment when debtor
gains possession pursuant to agreement giving him any interest more than naked possession).
Several courts have stated that the debtor's right of redemption under U.C.C. § 9-506 (1972)
is transferable. E.g., Sturdevant v. First Sec. Bank, 186 Mont. 91, 606 P.2d 525, 528 (1980)
(purchaser of airplane could redeem, but only by paying off obligations secured under dragnet
clause); Fitchburg Yarn Co. v. Wall & Co., 46 A.D.2d 763, 361 N.Y.S.2d 170, 172 (1974)
(debtor's equity of redemption may be attached); Smith v. Guzman, N.Y.L.J., Feb. 14, 1975,
at 17, col. 5 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.) (purchaser at sheriff's sale buys nothing more than debtor's right
to redeem). Redemption is the repurchase of property by paying off a secured obligation.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1149 (5th ed. 1979). Under U.C.C. § 9-506, a debtor may redeem
collateral taken into possession by a secured party after default by paying off the secured debt
before the secured party has disposed or entered into a commitment to dispose of the collat-
eral.
In U.S. Indus., Inc. v. Gregg, 540 F.2d 142 (3d Cir. 1976), the Third Circuit held that a
pledgor of stock certificates retained a sequestrable interest in those certificates even though
the pledgor had only a contingent right to their return if and when the secured debt was paid.
Id. at 147; cf. Lipkowitz & Plant v. Affrunti, 95 Misc. 2d 849, 407 N.Y.S.2d 1010, 1013 (1978)
(assignor of notes retained interest in any excess proceeds that could be transferred). A
pledgor is a party delivering or who has delivered goods in pledge. A pledge is a bailment of
goods to a creditor as security for an obligation. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1038 (5th ed.
1979). The court in Gregg noted that under § 9-506 the debtor retained a right to the return of
the collateral upon discharge of the underlying obligation. Cf. U.C.C. § 9-404 (1972) (debtor
may require secured party to file termination statement when all underlying obligations have
been fulfilled). The Gregg court stated that the debtor's rights under article 9 are in the collat-
eral itself and that a creditor could reach those rights under § 9-311. 540 F.2d at 146. The
court offered no authority for this assertion. Since § 9-311 authorizes transfer only of the
debtor's rights "in the collateral," the question remains whether creditors may reach rights of
the debtor not in the collateral. The answer should be yes, unless those rights are encompassed
by a prior security interest.
In Sheffield Progressive, Inc. v. Kingston Tool Co., 10 Mass. App. 47, 405 N.E.2d 985
(1980), the plaintiff unsecured creditor alleged that the debtor and his secured creditors had
arranged a transfer of the debtor's assets to one of the secured creditors for one third of the
market value of the assets in order to defraud the unsecured creditors. The court held that
under U.C.C. § 9-507 (1978) a debtor may recover from a secured party for any failure by the
secured party to fulfill its obligation under U.C.C. § 9-504(3) (1978) to dispose of the collateral
in a commercially reasonable manner. 405 N.E.2d at 988. Under § 9-311 unsecured creditors
could reach and exercise the debtor's right to recover against a secured party for the loss
caused by the secured party's misconduct. Id.
Article 9 gives the debtor several other rights not yet discussed in cases involving § 9-311.
See supra note 65 for debtor's rights under U.C.C. §§ 9-207, 9-502(2), & 9-504(2); see also id.
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the secured party forecloses its interest.198 The continuing security interest
in the collateral will likely hinder sale and diminish proceeds. 199 The debtor
may be liable for a larger deficiency if proceeds are diminished. 2°°
Despite these disadvantages a majority of courts have followed the "sub-
ject to" approach perhaps primarily because the approach remains consis-
tent with the language of section 9-311 and courts can implement this
approach with a minimum of judicial innovation and oversight, 20 1 although
not necessarily a minimum of litigation. In effect this treatment leaves the
parties to litigate their rights after the fact of transfer, instead of providing
means to resolve conflicts before transfer occurs. Unlike other approaches
discussed in previous sections of this Comment, the "subject to" approach
does not require notice to the secured party before execution on collateral.
Without notice a secured party cannot protect its interest. Creditors such as
those in Murdock may feel chagrined when found liable for a conversion
award that is larger than the amount of proceeds from the execution sale.202
Yet without any provision for reconciliation of competing claims before exe-
cution, the secured party may have no other remedy.
E. Unsecured Creditors Have No Recourse to Collateral
Only two cases have clearly denied unsecured creditors any resort to col-
lateral in which a secured party held a prior interest, and these cases have
not been followed by other courts. In William Iselin & Co. v. Burgess &
Leigh, Ltd. 203 the court vacated an unsecured creditor's levy on the grounds
that the secured party had priority and that, since the debtor had defaulted,
the secured party had a right to take possession of the collateral. 2° 4 In Har-
rison Music Co. v. Drake20 5 the court held that since the debtor had de-
§§ 9-404, supra, 9-504(2), supra note 125 (secured party must account to debtor for any pro-
ceeds of disposition), 9-505, supra note 113 (debtor may require repossessing secured party to
dispose of consumer goods if debtor has paid sixty percent of the cash price).
198. See supra note 105.
199. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
200. See supra notes 63, 104 and accompanying text.
201. Absent the necessary statutory provisions, alternative treatments such as those dis-
cussed supra in the text accompanying notes 116-51 would require courts to invent means by
which an unsecured creditor could obtain an accounting of the secured debt in order to execute
freely on the collateral, or by which the court could compel a secured party to dispose of the
collateral and apply any excess proceeds to the unsecured creditor. In contrast, courts can
effectuate the "subject to" approach merely by holding that the secured party's rights survive
transfer.
202. See supra notes 171-77 and accompanying text. For discussion of why unsecured
creditors should be required to notify secured parties befqre executing on collateral and should
be able to obtain a hearing to contest priority to the collateral, see Wechsler, supra note 73, at
393-95.
203. 52 Misc. 2d 821, 276 N.Y.S.2d 659 (Sup. Ct. 1967). Contra Roemer & Zeller, Inc. v.
Ace Transmission Center, Inc., 114 Misc. 2d 415, 454 N.Y.S.2d 377, 378 (Sup. Ct. 1982)
(junior secured party had right to sell collateral because senior secured party may not unilater-
ally protect debtor's assets).
204. 276 N.Y.S.2d at 663.
205. 43 Pa. D. & C.2d 637 (C.P. Allegheny County 1967). But cf. First Pa. Banking &
Trust Co. v. Liberati, 282 Pa. Super. 198, 422 A.2d 1074, 1078 (1980) (secured party could not
garnish collateral validly transferred to creditor); see discussion infra notes 216-24 and accom-
panying text.
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faulted under the security agreement, the secured party could obtain a
discharge of a levy on the collateral.20 6 Although the results in these cases
may have been equitable on the facts, 20 7 the decisions rested upon a faulty
assumption. The courts assumed that, once the debtor had lost the right of
possession of the collateral through default, the debtor lost all other rights in
the collateral that could be reached by his other creditors under section 9-
311. 208 Two states require the value of the collateral to exceed the amount
of the security interest before a subordinate creditor may obtain
execution. 20
9
III. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SECTION 9-311 AND PRIORITY
RULES
One authority has suggested that a secured transaction under article 9
creates a kind of co-ownership in which the interests of the debtor and the
secured party are separate and complementary. 210 Theoretically, as a debtor
repays a secured debt the amount of the security interest decreases and the
debtor's equity or interest in the collateral increases.2 1' This description
may be misleading, however, in that it suggests that the secured party's and
the debtor's interests are mutually exclusive. A better description would
represent the two interests as co-extensive and undivided. In effect, both
interests comprehend the whole collateral, but the security interest has pri-
ority over the debtor's interest until the security interest is discharged.2 12
One purpose of section 9-311 is to prevent the secured party from improp-
erly locking up excess value in the collateral. 21 3 To permit transfer of more
than the excess, however, merely forces the secured party to sue to gain
satisfaction of the prior interest. 21 4 As a practical matter, therefore, courts
206. 43 Pa. D. & C.2d at 641.
207. If the value of the collateral did not exceed the amount of the secured debt, then the
court reached an equitable result because no excess value existed in the collateral to which
subordinate creditors should have had resort.
208. See supra note 197.
209. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-2406 (1983) (sale shall not be completed unless for an amount
in excess of the senior interest as determined by a court). See also N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 512:29 (1961 & Supp. 1983) (court may appoint receiver to dispose of property only if the
property will sell for more than the claims against it).
210. Henderson, supra note 18, at 194; cf U.C.C. § 9-202 (1978) (provisions apply whether
title is in debtor or secured party).
211. The debtor's equity increases if the value of the collateral either increases or decreases
more slowly than the amount of the remaining secured debt.
212. Even if the debtor has already paid more than the value of the collateral, if he defaults,
the secured party may foreclose its interest in the collateral, and all of the debtor's rights in the
collateral will be transferred to the purchaser. U.C.C. § 9-504(4) (1978).
The debtor has rights in the collateral, other than his equity interest, that may be transfera-
ble. See supra note 197.
213. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
214. This statement simplifies the outcome in that the secured party may not sue in all
cases. If either the debtor or the transferee of the collateral are uncooperative, however, the
secured party may incur considerable expense in attempting to locate the collateral or foreclose
its security interest. Cf Nickles, supra note 5, at 390 (right of secured party to repossess
collateral from execution purchaser not sufficient to make secured party whole because of
additional inconvenience, costs, and risk that secured party may be unable to locate collateral).
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should construe the debtor's rights in the collateral to comprise only the
value in excess of the security interest.215
The court in First Pennsylvania Banking & Trust Co. v. Liberati 216 treated
the secured party's and the debtor's interests as if they were separate and
mutually exclusive. Liberati, a construction contractor, entered a security
agreement with the plaintiff bank. In exchange for the bank's promise to
make loans from time to time, Liberati granted the bank a security interest
in all of his present and future accounts receivable. Liberati also entered an
agreement with Reliance Insurance Co. in which Reliance agreed to act as
surety for Liberati. The bank made a loan to Liberati of over $200,000. A
township subsequently engaged Liberati to construct a sewer system. After
problems arose during construction, arbitration fixed Liberati's compensa-
tion at $63,000, and Reliance feared that it would be liable for a large sum.
Reliance asked the township to withhold payment on its account receivable
for Liberati until an arrangement could be made to reimburse Reliance for
its expense. The township, Reliance, and Liberati reached an agreement
specifying that the township would make payment to Liberati's attorneys,
with $25,000 of the amount to be accepted on behalf of Reliance. After
receipt by Liberati's attorneys but before distribution to Reliance and Liber-
ati, the secured party bank attempted to garnish the entire amount. The
appellate court held that the garnishment was invalid as to the $25,000 ac-
cepted on behalf of Reliance,217 reasoning that Liberati's attorneys accepted
the $25,000 as agents of Reliance.218 According to the court Liberati had
effected a valid transfer of his interest in the $25,000 to Reliance under sec-
tion 9-311.219 The bank's rights as garnishor extended only as far as its
debtor's, and since Liberati no longer had any interest in the $25,000, the
bank could not garnish the money.220 Even if the bank's security interest in
the money continued under section 9-306 despite the transfer, the court
stated that garnishment was not a proper procedure to pursue collateral in
the hands of a transferee or its agent.221
The court did not hold that the debtor's transfer of his own interest in the
collateral cut off the security interest. The court reasoned that the bank
sought to reach its own interest in the collateral and not Liberati's interest.
Since the garnishment procedure permits a creditor to reach the debtor's
interest in property,222 the court held that the bank could not use that proce-
See also id. at 386 (state law does not usually require notice to secured party of levy on collat-
eral); id. at 396 (no record kept of identity of purchaser at some execution sales).
215. Either alternatively or in addition, imposition by state law of a requirement that un-
secured creditor notify secured parties before executing on collateral would alleviate this prob-
lem. See Weschler, supra note 73, at 393; see also infra notes 238-44 and accompanying text.
216. 282 Pa. Super. 198, 422 A.2d 1074 (1980).
217. 422 A.2d at 1076-78.
218. Id. at 1076.
219. Id. at 1077.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 1077-78. The court cited U.C.C. § 9-306 comment 3 (1978) as support for its
reasoning. 422 A.2d at 1077.
222. See supra note 37 for definition of garnishment.
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dure to reach its own interest in the collateral.223 The court's decision in
Liberati defeats an important purpose of a security interest. When collateral
is not sufficiently valuable to satisfy both the secured party's and the debtor's
interests, article 9 provides for the secured party to receive payment in full
and for the debtor to receive only the remainder.224
Under the better interpretation of section 9-311, the secured party in effect
has priority over the debtor as to the whole collateral. Similarly, when arti-
cle 9 gives priority to a third party over the secured party, the third party
takes priority as to the whole collateral. The court in Earthmovers, Inc. v.
Clarence L. Boyd Co. 225 followed this construction. In that case the debtor
granted to Boyd a security interest in a bulldozer to secure a loan of $14,365.
The debtor subsequently engaged Earthmovers to extricate the bulldozer
from a pond and restore it. Earthmovers' bill for services and parts
amounted to $2,257. When the debtor failed to pay the bill, Earthmovers
asserted a statutory mechanic's lien,226 gave statutory notice to the debtor
and to Boyd, and held a public sale. Earthmovers bought the bulldozer for
$192 more than its bill. Boyd sought to foreclose its security interest in the
bulldozer, arguing that under section 9-311 foreclosure of a statutory lien
operated only to transfer the debtor's rights and did not affect the secured
party's interest, which continued in the collateral. Earthmovers argued that
its mechanic's lien had priority over Boyd's security interest under section 9-
310.227 The court held that section 9-311 did not apply to foreclosure of a
statutory lien;228 therefore, the sale foreclosing Earthmover's mechanic's lien
discharged Boyd's security interest in the collateral. 229
Earthmovers presents the question of whether courts should construe sec-
tion 9-311 to limit the subject matter transferred to the debtor's rights, or
should consider the section inapplicable in cases in which priority rules or
statutes purport to permit transfer of the whole collateral. This issue is bur-
ied in cases following the "subject to" approach discussed in Part II of this
Comment. 230 The language of section 9-311 implies that transfer is subject
to the security interest because only the debtor's rights in the collateral may
be transferred and not the secured party's interest. 231 Under this reading of
section 9-311 the issue of the secured party's priority in relation to a trans-
223. 422 A.2d at 1078. The court indicated that the bank might have prevailed in an
action for replevin or conversion. Id. at 1077.
224. U.C.C. § 9-504(1)-(2) (1978).
225. 554 P.2d 877 (Okla. Ct. App. 1976).
226. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, § 91 (West 1979) (lien on personal property for service
thereon).
227. U.C.C. § 9-310 (1978) states that when a person in the ordinary course of his business
furnishes services or materials with respect to collateral, a lien on the collateral for such serv-
ices or materials has priority over a perfected security interest.
228. 554 P.2d at 879.
229. Id. at 880; cf. Enloe v. Franklin Bank & Trust Co., 445 N.E.2d 1005, 1010 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1983) (transfer was default under security agreement; agreement required the debtor, not
the secured party, to maintain collateral; therefore, transferee had no claim against secured
part for cost of repairs).
230. See supra notes 152-202 and accompanying text.
231. U.C.C. § 9-311 (1978).
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feree of the collateral never arises because the secured party and the trans-
feree claim rights in different properties. This rationale was the basis of
Boyd's argument in Earthmovers and underlay the Court's decision in Liber-
ati.232 Under this analysis, although the mechanic's lien concededly has pri-
ority as to the debtor's rights in the collateral, the mechanic's lien may not
affect the secured party's interest. If Boyd's security interest comprehended
the whole value of the bulldozer, as the security interest must have since the
secured debt remained near $14,000 and the bulldozer sold for only $2,257,
the debtor had no equity in the bulldozer that Earthmovers could reach.
This interpretation makes sense because a purchaser of the bulldozer in an
ordinary sale should expect to have to pay off any secured debt and to pay
for necessary repairs. Another consequence of this interpretation is that if
the value of the collateral exceeds the amount of the secured debt, a secured
party should not be entitled to recover more than the amount of the debt.233
Under the alternative reading of section 9-311 transfer is effective as to the
whole collateral, including the security interest, which survives under sec-
tion 9-306. the issue of priority of the security interest in relation to other
claims then arises. Although a perfected security interest is superior to most
other claims under sections 9-201,234 9-301,235 and 9-307,236 according to
this interpretation the court in Earthmovers could properly conclude that a
mechanic's lien has priority under section 9-310. In this case the secured
party takes any proceeds in excess of the amount of the lien. This result
makes sense because the mechanic may have salvaged property that all par-
ties might otherwise have had to write off as a total loss. The mechanic does
not gain at the secured party's expense; rather, the secured party may be able
to reach a residue in the proceeds when it would otherwise have recovered
nothing.
Despite the implication of section 9-311 that only the debtor's rights may
be transferred, the court's decision in Earthmovers appears correct in light of
the overall plan of article 9. The priority rules would have little meaning if
232. Earthmovers, Inc. v. Clarence L. Boyd Co., 554 P.2d at 879.
233. This interpretation avoids the harsh result of holding a creditor who obtained a valid
transfer under § 9-311 liable in conversion for the value of the whole collateral when the secur-
ity interest in the collateral was relatively small. Theoretically the debtor should receive from
the secured party any proceeds from the conversion recovery in excess of the secured debt.
The creditor might then seek to levy on that excess in the hands of the debtor. This treatment
is obviously less efficient then simply limiting the secured party's recovery from the creditor to
the value of the security interest. See Royal Store Fixture Co. v. New Jersey Butter Co., 114
N.J. Super. 263, 276 A.2d 153, 155 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1971) (applying Pennsylvania law to
allow a secured party recovery for conversion limited to the amount of the remaining secured
debt).
234. U.C.C. § 9-201 (1978) (security agreement effective against purchasers of the collat-
eral and against other creditors).
235. Id. § 9-301 (unperfected security interest subordinate to rights of one who becomes a
lien creditor before the interest is perfected).
236. Id. § 9-307 (buyer in ordinary course takes free of security interest). This provision is
generally considered inapplicable in cases involving involuntary transfers because an execution
sale is not within the ordinary course of business. Cf 30 AM. JUR. 2D Executions §§ 428-30
(1967) (doctrine of caveat emptor applies; execution purchaser buys only what debtor had and
is under duty to inform himself of limits of debtor's interest in property).
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their effect were limited to the debtor's rights in the collateral.237 The draft-
ers of article 9 probably intended transfers effected by parties having priority
under the priority rules to be effective as to the whole collateral. The results
may be unsatisfactory, however, when the secured party did not have notice
of the sale or failed to anticipate that sale might cut off its interest. Thus, in
two other cases involving mechanic's liens, the courts reached the opposite
result from the court in Earthmovers by inventing special rules.
In Paccar Financial Corp. v. Harnett Transfer, Inc. 238 one person served as
stockholder, director, and president of both the debtor corporation and an-
other corporation, Harnett Transfer. Harnett Transfer performed repairs on
the collateral, a truck, but the debtor corporation failed to pay the bill. Har-
nett Transfer then asserted a mechanic's lien. The debtor corporation
purchased the truck at the foreclosure sale for an amount close to the
amount of the repair bill. The court held that when a purchaser of the col-
lateral buys at a sale foreclosing a statutory mechanic's lien for a bill that the
purchaser failed to pay, and the price essentially represents the unpaid bill,
then the sale does not discharge the security interest.239
In First National Commerce & Finance Co. v. Indiana National Bank24°
the debtor granted a security interest in an airplane. Another corporation
performed repairs worth $900 on the airplane. The debtor failed to pay the
bill and defaulted on its payments on the secured debt, of which $76,279
remained. The court held that, although under section 9-310 a statutory
mechanic's lien takes priority over a security interest, the purchaser at the
foreclosure sale takes subject to the security interest, at least when the se-
cured party did not have notice of the sale. 24 ' To hold otherwise, the court
stated, would deprive the secured party of due process. 242 The security in-
terest was subordinate only to the extent of the amount of the mechanic's
claim against the collateral. 243 Paccar and First National illustrate the need
for a requirement that unsecured creditors give notice to secured parties
before executing on collateral.244
IV. CONCLUSION
The majority of courts have successfully avoided two plausible misread-
ings of section 9-311. One misreading allows third parties to pre-empt a
security interest by effecting an involuntary transfer and thereby terminate
237. For example, a mechanic's lien on a recently purchased car might be worth little if
limited to the debtor's equity in the car. See generally Jackson & Kronman, supra note 44, at
1161-78.
238. 51 N.C. App. 1, 275 S.E.2d 243 (1981).
239. 275 S.E.2d at 248.
240. 360 So. 2d 791 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
241. Id. at 796-97.
242. Id.
243. Id. at 796. The dissent objected to judicial imposition of a requirement of actual no-
tice. Id. at 797 (Carroll, J., dissenting).
244. See supra note 215 and accompanying text.
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the security interest in collateral. 24 5 The other misreading allows the se-
cured party to limit transfer to only the debtor's rights in the collateral even
if the third party had priority.246 The emerging majority rule holds that if a
secured party has priority, the secured party has a right to the whole collat-
eral. Other creditors may reach the debtor's rights in the collateral, but their
claims are subordinate and subject to discharge by foreclosure of the security
interest. If, however, another creditor has priority over the secured party,247
the creditor has a superior right to the whole collateral. The security inter-
est may continue in the collateral, but the interest is subordinate and may be
discharged by sale. This interpretation of section 9-311 is consistent with the
language of that section, with the overall plan of article 9, and with the
underlying purposes of the Code. One of the policies of article 9 is to further
the free alienability of property rights.248 Article 9 tends to remove restric-
tions on debtors' ability to encumber or transfer their interests.24 9 In partic-
ular, section 9-311 enables a debtor to deal more freely with his property
rights and ensures that the debtor is not made judgment-proof by a financing
arrangement with a secured party.250 The majority approach furthers these
policies by allowing transfer without sacrificing priority.
Because the trend toward this interpretation is likely to continue, revision
of section 9-311 appears unnecessary. Since the section explicitly speaks of
transfer of only the debtor's rights, however, inclusion in the official com-
ment to section 9-311 of a statement or example to the effect that transfer
need not be limited to the debtor's rights if the transferee has priority over
the secured party might be helpful.
Section 1-102 of the Code states that the underlying purposes of the Code
are to simplify and modernize the law, to permit continued expansion of
commercial practices, and to make the law uniform among the various juris-
dictions. 251 Insofar as state procedural law continues to vary, making the
procedural details of involuntary transfers under section 9-311 uniform will
remain difficult. The lack of prescribed procedures leaves courts great flexi-
bility.252 The best direction for changes in state law is toward providing the
procedural tools needed to resolve competing claims more equitably and effi-
ciently. One important purpose of article 9 is to promote the efficient con-
245. This is the approach taken by Delaware. See supra notes 96-115 and accompanying
text.
246. This approach is the one argued for by the secured party in Earthmovers. See supra
notes 225-33 and accompanying text.
247. E.g., U.C.C. §§ 9-301, -307, -308, -309, -310, -312 (1978).
248. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
249. Id.
250. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
251. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
252. For example, in Dick Warner Cargo Handling Corp. v. Aetna Bus. Credit Inc., 700
F.2d 858 (2d Cir. 1983), the district court held that a fund possessed by the secured party
could not be garnished, since the debtor had only a contingent right to return of the money,
and under Connecticut law a contingent interest could not be garnished. Id. at 861. The
circuit court, openly seeking a way to permit a transfer in accord with § 9-311, reversed, hold-
ing that the fund was due but subject to a condition subsequent and therefore garnishable.
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duct of business by rewarding providence and diligence.253 Article 9 also
promotes efficiency by ensuring the availability of important information to
those who have a legitimate need for it.254 State law should require notice to
a secured party before allowing execution on the collateral to be com-
pleted.2 5 Some of the more desirable treatments, such as allowing the se-
cured party to dispose of the collateral if disposition must be made, 256 may
be impossible in the absence of notice. Also, state law should provide means
for an unsecured creditor to obtain an accounting of the remaining secured
debt 257 or to contest a secured party's priority.2 58 Without such means, un-
secured creditors may abandon some claims and pursue others to no
purpose. 259
253. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
254. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
255. See supra notes 215, 238-44 and accompanying text, and text accompanying note 202.
256. See supra notes 137-51 and accompanying text. Another treatment that requires no-
tice to the secured party is when the judgment creditor pays off the secured debt before or
shortly after execution. See supra notes 116-36 and accompanying text. Most important, how-
ever, is that notice gives the secured party a chance to monitor disposition of the collateral and
protect its interest.
257. See supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text.
258. See supra note 76 and accompanying text and text accompanying note 202.
259. Id.
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